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I.  INTRODUCTION 
An explosion of capitalistic innovation has profoundly impacted the 
modern investment landscape.1  This increase in entrepreneurial activity 
has precipitated a corresponding increase in the demand for capital both for 
starting new business ventures and for managing a pre-existing company’s 
operational needs for capital.2  As a result, capital formation, as defined as 
a company’s ability to effectively and efficiently raise capital for various 
needs at different junctures in its life, will undoubtedly remain an integral 
economic process.  Fortuitously, this increased demand for capital has been 
matched by an increase in modernized capital-financing alternatives.  For 
example, companies may be able to access the trillion dollar equity or debt 
markets, such as the Rule 144A markets.3  Similarly, these companies may 
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 1. See Steven Dresner, Introduction to PIPES:  A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN 
PUBLIC EQUITY 4 (Steven Dresner & E. Kurt Kim eds., rev. & updated ed. 2006) (“Changing 
market dynamics will forever impact the capital requirements of issuers and the risk/return 
tolerances of investors.  The need to bridge the two promotes continuous innovation in the 
design of deals.”). 
 2. Id.; MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW § 3.01 (4th ed. 2007). 
 3. See Scott J. Gelbard, Institutional Private Placements and Other Financing 
Alternatives, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE 
HANDBOOK COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 532 (1997) (“Rule 144A provides a safe harbor 
exemption from the registration requirements of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, for 
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seek to tap into alternative pools of capital by conducting registered public 
offerings or by employing various other mechanisms that, if effectively 
utilized, provide them with financing for their various needs.4 
While the recent increase in the array of financing options available 
for enterprises paints an optimistic picture for a company seeking capital, 
several realities diminish a wholesale acceptance of this proposition.  First, 
market dynamics can often adversely impact a company’s ability to raise 
capital.5  To illustrate, a recent comprehensive assessment of U.S. markets 
indicates that these markets are experiencing a significant decline in 
competitiveness.6  This deterioration may effectively depress economic 
activity, reducing the willingness of financial institutions to undertake the 
requisite funding and otherwise severely impeding capital formation 
optimization.7  As a consequence of these recent market developments, 
companies are increasingly in search of innovative solutions to their 
resale of unregistered securities to Qualified Institutional Buyers (‘QIBS’).”); Stephen M. 
Graham, Financing Alternatives for Public Companies, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE 
CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 111–116 (2006) (describing the 
general structure of Rule 144A debt offerings); see also Sagient Research, 
http://www.sagientresearch.com/pt/Gstats.cfm?Type=2 (last visited Oct. 21, 2008) 
(recognizing 117 deals transacted under Rule 144A exemptions totaling $52,321,981,500, in 
2007). 
 4. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL & SAMUEL WOLFF, GOING PUBLIC HANDBOOK § 2:78 
(2007) (stating that private placement and offshore offerings are common alternatives to 
financing in the securities market); Gabriel Nahoum, Note, Small Cap Companies and the 
Diamond In the Rough Theory:  Dispelling the IPO Myth and Following the Regulation A 
and Reverse Merger Examples, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1865, 1898-1908 (2007) (discussing 
the pros and cons of regulation A exemptions and reverse mergers as alternatives to 
registered public offerings).  See generally RICHARD A. BOOTH, FINANCING THE 
CORPORATION § 1:8 (2008) (discussing sources of capital for established businesses). 
 5. COMMITTEE ON CAPITAL MARKETS REGULATION, THE COMPETITIVE POSITION OF THE 
U.S. PUBLIC EQUITY MARKET 32 (2007), available at 
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/The_Competitive_Position_of_the_US_Public_Equity_Ma
rket.pdf (“By almost any meaningful measure, the competitive ness of the U.S. public equity 
market has significantly deteriorated in recent years.  From 2006 to 2007, most measures 
[assessing the U.S. markets] either continued to decline or failed to substantially improve.”); 
see also id. (noting that continuation of this trend will likely have a significant negative 
impact on the activity of U.S. capital markets, including the formation and efficient 
allocation of capital). 
 6. Id. (noting that the decline in the competitiveness of the U.S. private equity markets 
has a negative impact on the U.S. economy in aggregate and is “continuing amid 
challenging market conditions worldwide and growing concern about U.S. economic 
fundamentals”). 
 7. Id.  This deterioration is compounded by other regulatory developments that also 
have arguably impeded effective capital formation.  See also Task Force on Hedge Funds, 
Report on Section 3(C)(1) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Proposals to Create 
an Exception for Qualified Purchasers, 51 BUS. LAW. 773, 791 (1996) (calling for a 
reexamination of the rationale of Section 3(c)(1) due to its impediment on investment 
vehicles, and thus, on capital formation). 
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financing needs.8  More than ever, affected companies aggressively seek 
financing options that offer the dual objectives of versatility and efficiency. 
One recent financing alternative that is steadily gaining recognition as 
a viable capital formation mechanism is a “private investment” in public 
equity, or PIPE.9  To a large degree, PIPEs are increasingly viewed as an 
economical and efficient means for a publicly-traded company to procure 
capital funding.  This level of approbation in the United States is due in 
part to the legal and regulatory U.S. framework that enables these 
transactions to be consummated with relative ease.10  PIPEs are particularly 
important in the contemporary financing environment as current market 
conditions preclude many companies from accessing traditional public and 
private sources of financing.11 
From a transactional perspective, PIPEs are privately issued equity or 
equity-linked securities that are normally sold to “accredited investors”12 
 8. See Mihkel E. Voore & Leela Hemmings, Evolution of the Unallocated Shelf 
Prospectus, CORP. FIN. 2 (2003), available at 
http://www.stikeman.com/newslett/CorpFinancing04.pdf (“Securities regulators in the 
United States and Canada have been called upon increasingly in recent years to demonstrate 
flexibility in the face of market realities and competitive challenges and to be sensitive to 
the proposition that the speed and efficiency with which issuers can gain access to capital 
markets directly affects their success.”); see also Laura Mueller, The Big Squeeze, AIRLINE 
BUS., Feb. 2008, at 48 (“[U]ncertain market conditions could result in fewer capital market 
financings, as the costs of these deals have risen relative to the economic benefits realized 
by their issuers.”). 
 9. See Dresner, supra note 1, at 1 (“The use of PIPEs as a means to raise capital 
continues to grow as those in the financial markets and managers of public companies gain 
increasing access to information on the topic of private investments in public equity.”). 
 10. See Barbara A. Jones et al., Structuring PIPE Transactions in Key European 
Jurisdictions, 37 INT’L L. 23, 23 (2003) (“PIPE transactions have not enjoyed the same level 
of popularity in Europe as in the United States, in large part because the legal and regulatory 
framework in many European jurisdictions hinder the ease with which such transactions can 
be completed”). 
 11. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text; see also Richard E. Gormley, 
Overview:  An Emerging Market, in PIPES:  A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC 
EQUITY, supra note 1, at 10 (“PIPEs . . . provide an alternative financing vehicle for public 
companies in circumstances in which a public follow-on equity or equity-linked offering is 
not desirable, advisable, or possible.”).  See generally Graham, supra note 3, at 79 
(discussing how it is increasingly more common for public companies in need of capital to 
choose alternative sources of funding other than traditional public offerings). 
 12. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2008) (defining an “accredited investor [as] any person 
who comes within any of the following categories, or who the issuer reasonably believes 
comes within any of the following categories . . . at the time of the sale of the securities to 
that person”: 
1) Any bank as defined in Section 3(a)(2) of the Act, or any savings and loan 
association or other institution as defined in Section 3(a)(5)(A) of the Act, 
whether such bank, savings and loan association, or other institution is acting in 
its individual or fiduciary capacity; 
2) Any broker or dealer registered under the Exchange Act and purchasing for 
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by public companies in a hybrid transaction typically involving a 
Regulation D private placement13 followed by a registered public 
its own account; 
3) Any insurance company as defined in Section 2(a)(13) of the Securities Act; 
4) Any registered investment company or business development company; 
5) Any licensed small business investment company; 
6) Any plan established and maintained by a state, its political subdivisions, or 
any agency or instrumentality of a state or its political subdivisions, for the 
benefit of its employees, if such plan has total assets in excess of $5 million; 
7) Any employee benefit plan within the meaning of the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) if (i) the investment decision is made by 
a plan fiduciary, which is either a bank, savings and loan association, insurance 
company, or registered investment adviser; or (ii) the employee benefit plan has 
total assets in excess of $5 million; or (iii) the plan is a self-directed plan, with 
investment decisions made solely by persons who are accredited investors; 
8) Any private business development company as defined in Section 202(a)(22) 
of the Advisers Act; 
9) Any Internal Revenue Code Section 501(c)(3) exempt organization, 
corporation, limited liability company, Massachusetts or similar business trust, 
or partnership—with total assets in excess of $5 million not formed for the 
specific purpose of acquiring the securities offered; 
10) Any director, executive officer, or general partner of the issuer of the 
securities being offered or sold, or any director, executive officer, or general 
partner of a general partner of that issuer; 
11) Any natural person whose (i) individual net worth, or joint net worth with 
that person’s spouse, at the time of the purchase exceeds $1 million, or (ii) 
income or joint income with that person’s spouse exceeds $200,000 or 
$300,000, respectively, in each of the two most recent years, and who has a 
reasonable expectation of reaching that same income level in the current year; 
12) Any trust with total assets exceeding $5 million not formed for the specific 
purpose of acquiring the securities offered, and whose purchases are directed by 
a sophisticated person; and 
13) Any entity in which all equity owners are accredited investors.) 
See also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(51)(a) (defining “qualified purchaser” as stated in the 1940 
Investment Company Act); Revisions of Limited Offering Exemptions in Regulation D, 
Securities Act Release No. 33-8828, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,116 (Aug. 10, 2007) (explaining the 
SEC’s proposal to add a new class of individual accredited investors—namely those 
individuals who have at least $750,000 in investments). 
 13. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.  Rule 506 of Regulation D is the provision normally invoked 
in this context.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)(1933) (stating that offerings conducted pursuant to 
Rule 506 are state-preempted with respect to the exemption and registration mandates).  See 
generally Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Under State Blue Sky Laws—Federal 
Preemption—Rule 506 Offerings, 10 INT’L CAP. MARKETS & SEC. REG. § 10:37 (2003) 
(discussing preemption provisions added by The National Securities Markets Improvement 
Act of 1996 (NSMIA), the most significant of which includes a rule adopted under Section 
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offering.14  PIPE issuers range in size from small, over-the-counter 
(“OTC”) bulletin board companies to large-cap, NYSE-traded companies.15  
In terms of transaction frequency, PIPEs have dramatically increased from 
the 306 transactions recorded in 1996 to the 1,454 deals that were closed in 
2007.16  The aggregate PIPE deal value during this same period also has 
grown from just over $4 billion dollars to a whopping $83 billion dollars—
a staggering 17
Although once considered a financing alternative of last resort used 
mainly by cash-strapped companies or issuers otherwise unable to secure 
traditional sources of capital,18 the PIPE market now attracts sophisticated 
market players.19  Several factors are responsible for PIPE’s emergence as 
a viable capital-raising alternative.  Regulatory changes, the increasing 
difficulty of accessing so-called traditional capital sources previously 
alluded to, and entrepreneurial ingenuity have all contributed to PIPE’s 
4(2) of the Securities Act, which includes Rule 506, but not Rule 505 and 504 offerings). 
 14. See Dresner, supra note 1, at 1. 
 15. See Gormley, supra note 11, at 19 (“The PIPE/RD issuer universe is populated by 
small-cap and mid-cap growth companies, although an increasing number of companies 
with larger market capitalizations and/or in traditional industries have begun to utilize these 
financing formats”); see also Steve Winters, MANAGING RISK:  SECURITIES STRUCTURES, 
TRADING AND DEAL DOCUMENTATION, IN PIPES:  A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN 
PUBLIC EQUITY, 205 (rev. and updated ed. 2006) (“PIPEs have continued to attract an 
extremely diverse group of professional investors, ranging from Warren Buffett’s Berkshire 
Hathaway to traditional mutual fund investors and numerous hedge funds pursuing an 
arbitrage or deep value investment platform”). 
 16. Sagient Research, http://www.sagientresearch.com/pt/GStats.cfm?Type=6 (last 
visited Oct. 21, 2008); see also William K. Sjostrom, Jr., PIPEs, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. 
L.J. 381, 382 (2007) (noting that PIPEs have become an important source of financing for 
many small public companies). 
 17. Sagient Research, supra note 16 (indicating an $83 billion aggregate PIPE deal 
value in 2007—a $55 billion jump from the $29 billion aggregate in 2006); see also 
Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 382 (noting that the success enjoyed by hedge funds in investing 
in PIPEs has been so great that in the last two years, the SEC has brought a number of 
enforcement actions against the hedge funds accusing them of insider trading and violations 
of the registration requirements of the Securities Act in connection with PIPE investments). 
 18. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 381-82 (finding that “[w]hile companies of all sizes 
have used PIPEs to raise money, PIPE deals have emerged as a vital financing source for 
small public companies.”); see id. at 382 (observing that the PIPE deals completed in 2006 
were generally executed by companies with market capitalizations of $250 million or less 
and that these statistics are often attributable to the “reality that PIPEs represent the only 
available financing option for many small public companies”); Susan Chaplinsky & David 
Haushalter, Financing Under Extreme Uncertainty:  Contract Terms and Returns to Private 
Investments in Public Equity 2 (May 2006) (unpublished article), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=907676 (stating that firms that face difficulty raising capital 
through traditional financing instruments often use PIPEs). 
 19. See Dresner, supra note 1, at 27 (“The PIPE marketplace has been utterly 
transformed during the past decade from a fledging cottage industry into a dynamic and 
robust sector of the corporate finance landscape.”); see also WINTERS, supra note 15, at 205-
206 (commenting on the diverse group of professional investors that PIPEs attract). 
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rising popularity.20 
Despite this rising popularity, scant comprehensive coverage has been 
given to PIPEs and their role in the overall capital formation landscape, 
particularly in light of recent significant regulatory developments.  The 
purpose of this article is to highlight PIPEs as an alternative financing 
technique, in light of recent changes in the regulatory framework within 
which PIPEs and similar financing transactions are executed.  To this end, 
Part II sets the stage for a comprehensive discussion of PIPEs by providing 
an overview of the traditional financing sources typically available to 
companies.  Part III then provides a substantive evaluation of PIPEs and 
covers topics including the definition of a PIPE, the PIPE market, and the 
investment benefits generally attributed to PIPEs.  Part IV continues the 
discussion of PIPEs and focuses primarily on the recent regulatory 
developments that have positioned PIPEs ideally in the capital formation 
arena.  Part V asserts that, on balance, PIPEs deservedly have emerged as a 
viable capital formation alternative, concluding that, given the uncertainty 
engendered by recent regulatory developments, both issuers and investors 
must proceed with PIPE transactions in a strategic manner. 
II.  OVERVIEW OF TRADITIONAL CAPITAL FORMATION OPTIONS 
This section provides an overview of the traditional capital financing 
alternatives and focuses primarily on registered public offerings and private 
placements.  While there are a plethora of ways to finance transactional 
structures, both conventional and exotic, these options generally involve 
either a public offering, a private placement or a combination thereof.  As 
such, this section’s analysis focuses on the public offering and private 
transactional exemptions.21 
A.  Registered Public Offerings 
Section 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (the “1933 Act”) is the 
foundation of the federal securities law regulatory framework as it pertains 
 20. See, e.g., Marine Cole, Debt Strain Unclogs PIPEs:  Bank of America’s $2 billion 
investment in Countrywide marks the return of private investments in public equity, FIN. 
WEEK, Sep. 10, 2007, http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070910 
/REG/70907014/1005/TOC (noting that some companies, especially mortgage-related and 
small-cap companies, have turned to PIPEs because access to bank loans has become 
difficult in the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis). 
 21. For a comprehensive discussion of the various financing alternatives available, see 
Abigail Arms, The Private Placement Alternative to a Public Offering, in PRACTISING LAW 
INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW & PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 135 (2004) (providing 
an overview of the private offering and resale exemptions available to issuers and investors 
under the Securities Act of 1933). 
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to registered public offerings.  Pursuant to section 5, it is unlawful for any 
person to sell securities unless a registration statement, filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”), is effective.22  In 
addition to setting forth the basic registration requirement, section 5 also 
articulates the prospectus delivery rules which state that a final statutory 
prospectus compliant with Section 10(a) of the 1933 Act must be accessible 
or delivered to the investor at or prior to the sale of a registered security.23  
While the registration requirement creates a formidable regulatory 
paradigm in the context of public offerings, there are several exemptions to 
this requirement that, if effectively perfected, allow an issuer to sell 
securities absent the filing of a registration statement.24  These exemptions 
are discussed more fully later in this section of the article.  Note, moreover, 
that irrespective of the Securities Act registration regimen, market 
conditions, costs of undertaking a public offering, and competitive 
challenges to induce reputable investment banks to underwrite a public 
offering pose significant hurdles for an unseasoned or financially troubled 
issuer to successfully effectuate a public offering.25 
Under the 1933 Act and the rules and regulations promulgated 
thereunder, a subject issuer has certain options, depending on its unique 
circumstances and overall profile, to undertake a registered public offering.  
These options may be principally distinguished by the disclosure 
requirements that are applicable to each of them and the manner in which 
those disclosure requirements can be satisfied.26  The predominant 
 22. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006).  This discussion simplifies the cumbersome registration 
requirements.  The SEC significantly revised and deregulated these mandates in 2005.  See 
Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 33-8591, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 
3, 2005) (adopting new rules to “eliminate unnecessary and outmoded restrictions on 
offerings”); MARC. I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 4.01-4.02 (5th ed. 2008) 
(providing discussion and materials on the registration process); Joseph F. Morrissey, 
Rhetoric and Reality:  Investor Protection and the Securities Regulation Reform of 2005, 56 
CATH. U. L. REV. 561, 563–65 (2007) (providing an analysis of the 2005 revisions). 
 23. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b), (c) (2006); Securities Act Release No. 8591, 70 Fed. Reg. at 
44,722.  As part of the 2005 offering reform, the SEC eliminated prior Rule 434 and 
adopted a more flexible access-as-delivery approach in Rule 172.  See Securities Act, 17 
C.F.R. § 230.172 (2005) (creating exemptions to prospectus requirement). 
 24. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (2006) (providing an exemption for private 
offerings irrespective of the monetary amount raised); see also STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 
101 (“To protect investors and the integrity of the securities markets, the Securities Act of 
1933 (Securities Act or 1933 Act) has two basic objectives:  (1) to provide investors with 
adequate and accurate material information concerning securities offered for sale and (2) to 
prohibit fraudulent practices in the offer or sale of securities”). 
 25. See STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 39, 122-25. 
 26. DAVID A. CIFRINO & THOMAS P. CONAGHAN, THE PUBLIC COMPANY PRIMER:  A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO GOING PUBLIC, RAISING CAPITAL AND LIFE AS A PUBLIC COMPANY 47-
48 (2007), available at http://financial.rrd.com/wwwFinancial/Downloads/PDF/ 
RR%20Donnelley%20Public%20Company%20Primer.pdf (generally describing the various 
registration options available to a company seeking to conduct a registered public offering). 
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registration forms available to issuers are Form S-1 and Form S-3.27 
1. Registration Forms 
a. Form S-1 
Form S-1 is the basic form available to an issuer who wishes to “go 
public”28 (or is otherwise ineligible to use a more simplified form) to 
register any of its equity or debt securities to be sold in a public offering.29  
Form S-1 is considered a general purpose form used for the registration of 
securities under the 1933 Act and is typically available to all issuing 
companies that are not eligible or required to use a different form.30  The 
informational requirements that must be narratively set forth in a Form S-1 
are the most expansive of all the available registration forms.31  These 
heightened disclosure obligations are, in large part, attributable to the fact 
that Form S-1 is the registration form that new entrants into the registered 
offering arena are required to use.32  Until an issuer becomes eligible to use 
 27. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (2007) (describing SEC Form S-3); Revisions to the 
Eligibility Requirements for Primary Securities Offerings on Forms S-3 and F-3, Securities 
Act Release No. 33-8878, 72 Fed. Reg. 73,534 (Dec. 27, 2007) (describing revisions to 
Forms S-1 and S-3). 
 28. “Going public” is the process by which a privately-held issuer becomes publicly-
held under the federal securities laws.  Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, 3A 
SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE LAW § 8:1 (2d ed. 2007); STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 
§§ 3.01, 4.01; see also Carl W. Schneider et al., Going Public, in 2 VENTURE CAPITAL AND 
SMALL BUSINESS FINANCINGS §§ 12:1, 12:22 (Robert Haft ed., 2008) (discussing the 
attendant costs of going public); Johnathan A. Koff & Michael Lee, The Initial Public 
Offering Process, in PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE CORPORATE LAW AND PRACTICE COURSE 
HANDBOOK SERIES 114-16 (1997) (discussing the disadvantages associated with “going 
public,” including the increased risk of liability for directors under federal securities law). 
 29. See 17 C.F.R. § 239.11 (2006) (creating Form S-1, to be used for “securities of all 
registrants for which no other form is authorized or prescribed”). 
 30. See Revisions to the Eligibility Requirements for Primary Securities Offerings on 
Forms S-3 and F-3, Securities Act Release No. 33-8878, 72 Fed. Reg. at 73,539 (“[A]n 
issuer that is temporarily prevented from utilizing Form S-3 for shelf offerings to raise 
capital would not be foreclosed from registering a primary offering of securities on Form S-
1 or in private placements.”). 
 31. The informational requirements of SEC Form S-1 are contained in items 3-17.  17 
C.F.R. § 239.11.  Note also that the informational disclosure requirements for both the 
prospectus and subsequent portions of the Form S-1 registration statement are articulated by 
reference to the comprehensive disclosure requirements set forth in Regulation S-K and 
Regulation S-X.  See BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, supra note 28, at § 5:40 (describing the 
requirements for disclosure under Regulation S-K); see also 1B HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL 
& SAMUEL WOLFF, 1B GOING PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION § 12:30 (2007) 
(discussing the contents of the prospectus, i.e., the basic information package as well as the 
extensive in-depth information required by Form S-1 as contrasted with Form S-3). 
 32. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11.  Form S-1 is divided into two primary categories:  (i) Part I, 
which articulates the information required to be disclosed in the prospectus and (ii) Part II, 
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a different form, such as Form S-3, it is restricted to the use of Form S-1 
for all offerings, even those made subsequent to the initial public offering 
(“IPO”).33  Not surprisingly, due to the detailed disclosure that must be set 
forth if a subject issuer may not incorporate by reference34 and the fact that 
compliance with such disclosure mandates may impede a company’s ability 
to quickly access capital markets,35 Form S-1 is disfavored, particularly in 
the shelf offering context.36 
which provides the information that must be included in the registration statement, but is not 
expressly required to be included in the prospectus.  Id.  Note, however, that Form S-1 does 
not actually enumerate the informational disclosures for both the prospectus and the rest of 
the registration statement.  Rather, Form S-1 contains references to more particularized 
disclosure requirements articulated by Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X.  Id.  See 
generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 229 (dealing with the application of Regulation S-K and S-X). 
 33. 17 C.F.R. § 239.11.  Pursuant to the Form S-3 instructions in effect up until 
recently, a company that wished to use Form S-3 was required to have a class of securities 
registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and to have timely made all filings 
required under the Exchange Act for at least the twelve months preceding the filing of the 
registration statement.  In addition, the company was required to satisfy one of the form’s 
transactional requirements, depending on the type of offering to be conducted.  For example, 
in order to conduct a primary offering, a company was required to have a non-affiliate 
equity market capitalization, or “public float,” of at least $75 million.  While the recent 
amendments to Form S-3 left many of these requirements in place, new General Instruction 
I.B.6 to Form S-3 expands the universe of potentially eligible users by providing certain 
situations in which companies with a public float of less than $75 million are allowed to 
register primary offerings on Form S-3 provided that certain requirements are satisfied.  Id.; 
see also infra notes 163-199 and accompanying text (providing a more comprehensive 
discussion of the recent Form S-3 amendments). 
 34. While issuers have historically been prohibited from incorporating by reference 
when relying on Form S-1, pursuant to the 2005 Offering Rule Reform, this Form now 
permits certain issuers to incorporate by reference from Exchange Act periodic reports (such 
as Forms 8-K, 10-K, and 10-Q).  See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 394 n.90 (stating that 
allowing certain issuers to incorporate by reference from Exchange Act periodic reports has 
not significantly impacted PIPE issuers relying on Form S-1 because many were a blank 
check company, a shell company or a registered penny stock offering—entity types that are 
restricted from relying on the limited incorporation by reference available with the Form S-
1); see also 17 C.F.R. § 239.11, Form S-1, General Instruction VII. 
 35. See Revisions to the Eligibility Requirements for Primary Securities Offerings on 
Forms S-3 and F-3, Securities Act Release No. 33-8878, 72 Fed. Reg. at 247 (stating that 
the use of Form S-3 “allow[s] companies to avoid additional delays and interruptions in the 
offering process and can reduce or even eliminate the costs associated with preparing and 
filing post-effective amendments to the registration statement”). 
 36. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (2006).  For example, the automatic update 
feature that is available in the context of Form S-3 is not available to users of Form S-1.  
Consequently, such issuers using Form S-1 must manually update the shelf registration by 
filing supplements and or amendments with the SEC to incorporate information contained in 
the subject issuer’s periodic 1934 Exchange Act (the “1934 Act”) filings.  See also 
Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 394 (noting that the use of Form S-1 is likely to result in higher 
transaction costs for issuers given that these forms require more comprehensive disclosures, 
involve a longer preparation period, and often result in investors demanding higher 
discounts for compensation due to the longer period of illiquidity that the foregoing factors 
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b. Form S-3 
Due to the availability of incorporation by reference from Exchange 
Act periodic reports into the registration statement, Form S-3 is typically 
the favored registration form.37  Thus, a significant advantage that Form S-
3 provides is that it permits securities to be offered pursuant to a 
registration statement setting forth only a limited amount of information, 
such as a description of the plan of distribution and the securities being 
offered, while much of the information is incorporated by reference from 
the issuing company’s periodic filings made pursuant to the Exchange Act 
reporting framework.38  As a consequence, Form S-3 constitutes a more 
versatile option, especially with respect to an issuer’s ability to take 
advantage of shelf registration.39 
create). 
 37. See Sjorstrom, supra note 16, at 393 (generally describing the benefits associated 
with Form S-3); infra notes 163-199 and accompanying text (discussing recent amendments 
to Form S-3 eligibility requirements). 
 38. 17 C.F.R. § 239.13 (2006), SEC Form S-3.  Of course, material facts that occurred 
after the filing of the most recent Exchange Act report must be disclosed in Form S-3.  See 
Robert J. Haft & Peter M. Fass, 4 TAX-ADVANTAGED SECURITIES § 6:134 (2008) (stating 
that disclosure must be made in “quarterly updates to the risk factors disclosure to reflect 
any material changes from risks previously disclosed in Exchange Act reports”); see also 
BLOOMENTHAL & WOLFF, 1B GOING PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC CORPORATION, supra note 31, 
at § 12:19. 
 39. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (describing the conditions under which an 
offering and sale of securities may be delayed or continued).  In this context, “shelf 
registration” is a term used for Securities Act registration pursuant to SEC Rule 415 in 
which an issuer essentially places the offering on the shelf, enabling such issuer to access 
the securities markets quickly when conditions become favorable.  In at-the-market primary 
offerings, shelf registration is available to issuers capable of using a Form S-3.  Issuers 
generally prefer using a shelf registration because of the advantages it offers, including a 3-
year expiration date, favorable renewal options, elimination of limits for at-the-market 
equity offerings, automatic shelf registrations for well known seasoned issuers (WKSIs) 
(immediate effectiveness of registration statements) and a “pay as you go” filing system.  A 
disadvantage inherent in shelf offerings is that each new prospectus supplement filed 
extends the statute of limitations for possible Section 11 liability.  In sum, shelf offerings 
provide a convenient and efficient way for an issuer to quickly register stock and sell the 
subject securities in the open market.  See Securities Act Release No. 33-8878, supra note 
30. 
While the foregoing forms, particularly Form S-3, normally are the preferred and 
predominant registration forms, they are not the only registration options.  In particular, both 
Form S-4 and Form S-8 are specialized registration forms used in specific transactional 
scenarios.  For example, Form S-4 is the registration forms used when registering securities 
that will be exchanged in a context involving an acquisition or similar business combination 
(e.g., mergers, consolidations, and similar transactions).  As such, issuances of stock to the 
target company’s shareholders in such acquisitions are generally registered on Form S-4.  
Form S-4, like Form S-3, permits the issuer to incorporate information about itself by 
reference to its periodic Exchange Act filings, assuming the issuer is eligible under 
applicable Form S-3 requirements.  Similarly, Form S-8 is a specialized registration form 
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B. Registration Exemptions 
While the foregoing discussion focused on registered public offerings, 
there are several exemptions from Securities Act registration.  Depending 
on the circumstances, invocation of a particular exemption may enable an 
issuer to raise the requisite capital while avoiding the costs generally 
attributable to public offerings.40  Absent an exemption, all sales of 
securities must be registered pursuant to Section 5 of the Securities Act.41  
Moreover, unless the applicable state regulatory system for the sale of 
securities is preempted by federal law (such as pursuant to the 1996 
National Securities Market Improvement Act42) or an applicable state law 
offering exemption is met, the subject security generally must be registered 
in each state in which the issuer offers to sell the security.43  However, 
that allows public companies that file regular reports under the 1934 Act to register 
securities that are issued pursuant to employment-related stock awards and option plans.  
Essentially, Form S-8 enables Exchange Act reporting companies to issue shares to 
employees and consultants without having to comply with the more cumbersome 
registration Form S-1 or otherwise to perfect an exemption from Securities Act registration.  
In addition, Form S-8 also enables non-affiliate employees who receive these shares to resell 
such shares without having to comply with applicable resale limitations.  17 C.F.R. § 
239.16(b), SEC Form S-8 (2006).  See ROBERT J. WILD, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE SERIES:  
DESIGNING AN EFFECTIVE SECURITIES COMPLIANCE PROGRAM § 1:14 (2007) (“Form S-4 [is] 
used for securities to be issued as a result of a business combination or in an exchange offer 
such as those involving debt securities issued in a Rule 144A offering”); see also HR Series 
Comp. and Benefits § 10:69 (2nd Ed. 2008) (stating that Form S-8 was designed specifically 
for use in connection with non-statutory stock option plans implemented by employers). 
 40. See STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 38-39 (stating with respect to the preparation of the 
public offering registration statement, “[t]he disclosures required are detailed and complex, 
the document’s length is massive, and the costs of preparing the registration statement, 
including accountant, attorney, investment banker and printer fees, easily can run into the 
tens if not hundreds of thousands of dollars.”  In light of the foregoing factors, “the costs of 
having a “registered” offering under the Securities Act frequently will be substantial.”). 
 41. 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006).  The issuer bears the burden of proving that an 
exemption applies.  S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953).  Certain 
securities, such as municipal bonds, are exempt from Securities Act registration.  See David 
J. Gilberg, Regulation of New Financial Instruments Under the Federal Securities and 
Commodities Laws, 39 VAND. L REV. 1599, 1629 (1986) (explaining that the Securities Act 
establishes a number of exemptions from securities registrations including, “‘exempt 
securities,’ principally comprised of United States government securities and municipal 
bonds, [which] need not be registered”). 
 42. National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
290, 110 Stat. 3416, 3443 (1996) (“The Commission, by rule, may exempt any sale of 
securities . . . from any fee imposed by this section, if the Commission finds that such 
exemption is consistent with the public interest, the equal regulation of markets and brokers 
and dealers, and the development of a national market system.”). 
 43. See STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 132 (“With certain exceptions and subject to the 
preemptive provisions of the National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996, unless 
an exemption from state registration is perfected, any offer or sale within a particular state 
must be registered.”). 
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irrespective of the availability of an exemption from registration, the 
antifraud provisions of both federal and state securities laws apply.44  The 
following discussion briefly highlights issuer exemptions to the Section 5 
registration requirement that have particular relevance in the PIPE context. 
1. Section 4(2) Exemption 
The Section 4(2) exemption specifically provides that all “transactions 
by an issuer not involving a public offering,” are not subject to the Section 
5 registration requirement.45  The congressional intent underlying the 
Section 4(2) exemption is to exempt sales where there is no realistic need 
for such application or where the overall benefits are too remote.46  While 
the Section 4(2) exemption historically has been viewed as the key 
statutory private placement exemption available to issuers,47 its practical 
functioning is at times thwarted because the statute does not provide 
sufficient guidance with respect to its application.48  As a result, issuers 
may be placed in the precarious position of ascertaining compliance with 
Section 4(2)’s terms from judicial and administrative interpretations that, at 
times, are ambiguous, at best. 
The most relied upon judicial interpretation of the Section 4(2) 
exemption is the United States Supreme Court’s decision in SEC v. Ralston 
Purina Co.49  In that case, the Supreme Court made clear that the critical 
inquiry, with respect to the applicability of the Section 4(2) exemption, is 
whether the offerees are able to fend for themselves so as to render the 
registration mandate unnecessary.  Key determinants in this inquiry are the 
financial sophistication of each offeree and whether each offeree was 
provided with, or had access to, the kind of information that is contained in 
a registration statement.50  Ralston Purina and subsequent lower court 
 44. See STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 95 (noting that regardless of whether a 
transactional exemption is properly perfected pursuant to the applicable rules and 
guidelines, an issuing company will nonetheless be required to comply with antifraud 
restrictions imposed by a myriad of securities laws, namely the 1934 Act).  The Rule 506 
exemption is not within state regulation due to NSMIA preemption.  See § 18(b)(4) of the 
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (describing certain exempt offerings). 
 45. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (2006). 
 46. See H.R. REP. NO. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1933) (providing Congressional 
analysis of the Securities Act at the time of passage); see also SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 
346 U.S. 119 (1953) (examining congressional intent underlying the § 4(2) exemption).  
 47. See Carl W. Schneider, Section 4(1-½)—Private Resales of Restricted or Controlled 
Securities, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 501, 503 (1988) (stating that § 4(2) “is the general exemption 
for so-called ‘private placements’”). 
 48. See Federal Regulation of Securities Committee, Section 4(2) and Statutory Law, 31 
BUS. LAW. 485, 485 (1975) (noting uncertainty in application of § 4(2)). 
 49. 346 U.S. 119 (1953). 
 50. Id. at 126-27; Doran v. Petroleum Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 900 (5th Cir. 1977). 
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decisions examine several factors in order to determine Section 4(2)’s 
applicability in purportedly private transactions:   
the number of offerees and their relationships to each other and to 
the issuer; 
the manner of the offering; 
the sophistication and expertise of the offerees; 
the nature and type of information provided to offerees either 
directly or indirectly (i.e., by giving access); and 
the precautions employed by the issuer to prevent the resale of 
the underlying securities.51 
Application of the Section 4(2) criteria may result in lack of certainty, 
an especially troublesome consequence for market participants desiring 
successful consummation of “transactions.”52  Consequently, Rule 506 of 
Regulation D (“Reg D”), with its comparative certainty of application, is 
the modern-day exemption of choice, particularly in the PIPE setting.53 
2. Rule 506 – Section 4(2) Safe Harbor 
As a result of the commercial uncertainty created by the Section 4(2) 
exemption, the SEC promulgated Rule 506 of Reg D.54  To place the 
importance of Rule 506 in its proper context in the PIPE setting, a review 
of this regulation is in order. 
The first three rules of Reg D consist of general rules that apply to the 
Rule 506 exemption.55  For example, Rule 501 is a definitional section that 
provides the meaning of several key terms used throughout Reg D.56  A 
significant definition contained in Rule 501 is the definition of an 
“accredited investor,” which the rule defines as any person who comes 
 51. E.g., Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283 (4th Cir. 1978); Doran, 545 F.2d at 893.  
The size of the offering and the number of securities offered were considered relevant at 
some point but evidently no longer.  See STEINBERG, supra note 22, at 105. 
 52. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 391 (noting that the application of Section 4(2) is 
complicated by the fact that neither the 1933 Act nor any of the rules promulgated 
thereunder actually defines “public offering”). 
 53. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2006).  Other exemptions contained in Reg D include Rule 
504 and Rule 505.  See HR Series Compensation and Benefits, 2 COMP. AND BENEFITS, 
supra note 39, at § 10:92 (2008) (outlining the Regulation D exemptions available under 
Rules 504, 505, and 506). 
 54. See Revision of Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving 
Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 33-6389, 24 SEC Docket 1166 (March 
8, 1982) (attempting to simplify and classify exemptions and to “achieve uniformity 
between federal and state exemptions”). 
 55. These rules also apply, depending on the circumstances, to other Reg. D 
exemptions.  For example, the definition of “accredited investor” applies to both Rule 505 
and Rule 506.  17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501, 230.505, 230.506. 
 56. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2006). 
  
14 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW [Vol. 11:1 
 
 
within one of several specifically enumerated categories at the time of the 
offering.57 
Similarly, Rule 502 contains important rules concerning integration, 
information requirements, and manner of offering limitations.58  First, Rule 
502 contains a significant provision concerning the integration of 
offerings.59  Integration is the principle by which two or more offerings that 
are supposedly distinct and structured as separate may be “integrated,” or 
regarded by the SEC as one combined offering for which an exemption 
may not be available.60  The regulatory policy underlying integration is 
rather straightforward—it prevents an issuer and its promoters from 
inappropriately circumventing the registration requirements imposed by 
Section 5 of the 1933 Act by breaking a larger and possibly non-exempt 
offering into smaller, seemingly exempt offerings.61  Integration analysis is 
particularly applicable to PIPE transactions since the fundamental structure 
of these deals involves two offerings—a registered offering effected 
subsequent to a private placement.  As such, if these offerings were 
integrated and construed as one larger offering, a Securities Act registration 
violation would result.62 
There are generally two methods for determining if separate offerings 
are subject to integration.  First, if the two separate offerings are not 
executed within six months of each other, Rule 502(a) provides a safe 
harbor for Reg D offerings, thereby signifying that integration will not 
occur.63  Second, if offerings are made within six months of each other, a 
 57. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(3). 
 58. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502 (2006). 
 59. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a). 
 60. See generally Theodore W. Jones, The Doctrine of Securities Act “Integration”, 29 
SEC. REG. L.J. 320 (2001) (assessing the impact of basic Securities Act concepts on the 
development of the integration framework in light of the evolution of domestic capital 
markets); Daniel J. Morrissey, Integration of Securities Offerings—The ABA’s “Indiscrete” 
Proposal, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 41 (1984) (discussing the need for nuanced integration criteria to 
safeguard the registration process); Perry E. Wallace, Jr., Integration of Securities 
Offerings:  Obstacles to Capital Formation Remain for Small Businesses, 45 WASH. & LEE 
L. REV. 935 (1988) (examining several approaches to reforming the integration doctrine). 
 61. See, e.g., Donohoe v. Consol. Operating & Prod. Corp., 982 F.2d 1130, 1140 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (describing the purpose of the integration doctrine and giving deference to SEC 
interpretations of it); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633, 645-46 (9th Cir. 1980) (finding 
integration where the defendant-appellant had offered shares of limited partnerships at 
different times, but for the same purpose, under a single financing plan, and in return the 
same type of consideration). 
 62. Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 395. 
 63. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(b)(2) (2006) (creating a six-
month safe harbor from integration for intrastate offerings).  But see Securities Act Release 
No. 33-8828, supra note 12 (proposing to decrease this safe harbor from six months to 90 
days). 
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five-factor balancing test applies.64  These factors are whether the 
offerings:  (i) are part of a single plan of financing; (ii) involve the issuance 
of the same class of securities; (iii) were made about the same time; (iv) 
involve the same type of consideration; and (v) are made for the same 
general purposes.65  When offerings transpire within the safe harbor time 
periods, thereby mandating application of this five-factor test, the ad hoc 
nature of the test along with inconsistent judicial interpretation has resulted 
in commercial uncertainty.66  While the potential consequences of 
integration can be catastrophic, PIPE issuers generally are able to avert this 
risk by invoking Rule 152.67  According to Rule 152 and SEC 
interpretations thereunder,68 offerings made prior to a registration 
statement’s filing and conducted under circumstances not mandating 
registration, do not by the fact of registration become the sort of offerings 
which are proscri 69
 64. Non-Public Offering Exemption, Securities Act Release No. 33-4552, 27 Fed. Reg. 
11,316, 11,317 (Nov. 16, 1962). 
 65. Id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a); see also Jones, supra note 60, at 323-25 (explaining the 
five-factor test); Wallace, supra note 60, at 939-42 (identifying confusion surrounding the 
five-factor test). 
 66. See Leib M. Lerner, Disclosing Toxic PIPEs:  Why the SEC Can and Should 
Expand the Reporting Requirements Surrounding Private Investments in Public Equities 58 
BUS. LAW. 655, 675 (2003) (noting that since the SEC has stated that any of the factors can 
be determinative in the promulgation of the five-factor test, uncertainty is created for issuers 
over whether their offerings are subject to integration); see also Jones, supra note 60, at 
325; Morrissey, supra note 60; Wallace, supra note 60, at 939-42 (all discussing aspects of 
the uncertainty created by application of the five-factor test). 
 67. 17 C.F.R. § 230.152 (2006). 
 68. Id. (“The phrase transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering used in 
section 4(2) . . . shall be deemed to apply to transactions not involving any public offering at 
the time of said transactions although subsequently thereto the issuer decides to make a 
public offering and/or files a registration statement.”).  As is evident from the SEC’s 
approach to the application of Rule 152 in the context of PIPEs, the key analytical and 
factual consideration in this context is determining when the first phase of a PIPE 
transaction, typically the private offering, is complete.  Pursuant to Rule 152’s safe harbor 
and SEC interpretations thereof, a completed private offering component of a PIPE 
transaction will not be integrated with the subsequent public secondary offering if the first 
offering was properly “completed.”  The SEC’s position is that a private placement of PIPE 
shares is “completed” for purposes of satisfying Rule 152’s prerequisites if purchase 
commitments are in place from all participating investors such that the only existing 
contingencies are outside their control.  See Black Box Incorporated, 1990 SEC No-Act. 
Lexis 926; Squadron, Ellenoff, Pleasant & Leher, 1992 SEC No-Act. Lexis 363.  
Essentially, these purchase commitments must unequivocally establish that there is no room 
for any further investment decision on the part of participating investors. 
 69. See SEC DIVISION OF CORPORATE FINANCE, MANUAL OF PUBLICLY AVAILABLE 
TELEPHONE INTERPRETATIONS, at H (1997) [hereinafter SEC TELEPHONE MANUAL], 
available at http://www.sec.gov/interps/telephone.shtml (pointing out that the SEC 
interpretations even go so far as to allow an issuer to file a resale registration statement prior 
to the closing of the related private offering without the application of integration if:  (i) the 
private offering investors are “irrevocably bound to purchase a set number of securities of a 
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Rule 502 also contains provisions that specify the manner in which 
Rule 506 offerings must be conducted in order to be eligible for 
exemption.70  One such provision bans general solicitation and 
advertising.71  As interpreted by the SEC, a key criterion in determining 
whether a subject communication complies with the general solicitation 
and advertising bans is whether a pre-existing relationship existed with the 
prospective purchasers.72  A key basis underlying this criterion is that a 
pre-existing relationship enables the subject issuer and its financial 
intermediaries to assess investor suitability, namely, whether a prospective 
investor aptly can evaluate the merits of a contemplated investment.73  In 
set purchase price that is not based on market price or a fluctuation ratio, either at the time 
of effectiveness of the resale registration statement or at any subsequent date,” (ii) there are 
no conditions to closing that are within an investor’s control or that an investor can cause 
not to be satisfied,” and (iii) “[t]he closing of the private placement of the un-issued 
securities must occur within a short time after the effectiveness of the resale registration 
statement”); J.W. HICKS, LIMITED OFFERING EXEMPTIONS:  REGULATION D § 3:9 (2007-
2008) (discussing Rule 152); Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 396-97 (generally discussing the 
SEC Telephone Manual). 
 70. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(1), § 230.502(c) (2006).  Similarly, Rule 502 also contains 
rules that require issuers to provide specified information to investors targeted in Reg D 
offerings.  17 C.F.R. § 502(b)(1) (2006).  The applicability of Rule 502’s informational 
mandate generally hinges on the type of offeree a particular issuer is targeting in the private 
placement transaction.  For example, if the issuer is targeting only accredited investors, as 
defined by Rule 501, the issuer is not subject to Rule 502’s informational requirements.  
Conversely, if the issuer is targeting non-accredited investors in addition to accredited 
investors, the issuer is required to comply with Rule 502’s informational prescriptions.  
Because Rule 506 transactions in the PIPE context normally are made solely to accredited 
purchasers, no mandated information must be delivered to comply with the exemption.  See 
Dresner, supra note 1, at 65, 70. 
 71. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (“Neither the issuer nor any person acting on its behalf is 
permitted to offer to sell securities by any form of general solicitation or general advertising, 
including but not limited to (i) any advertisement, article, or other published or broad cast 
communication; or (ii) any seminar or meeting whose attendees have been invited by 
general solicitation of advertising”).  Note that a violation of the general solicitation or 
advertising ban is not subject to the substantial compliance defense of Rule 508.  17 C.F.R. 
§ 230.508 (2006). 
 72. Interpretive Release on Regulation D, Securities Act Release No. 33-6455, 1983 
WL 409415 (March 3, 1983). 
 73. See Mineral Lands Research and Marketing Corp., 1985 SEC No-Action Letter, 
1985 WL 55694 (arguing that the “manner of offering by the Company does not constitute 
general advertising or general solicitation because most of the offerees are a limited group 
with whom an officer and director of the issuer has a pre-existing business relationship”).  
More recently, the SEC has allowed issuers and financial intermediaries to demonstrate the 
presence of a “pre-existing relationship” by having an investor fill out a generic 
questionnaire about their investing habits in order to qualify them as accredited.  This 
questionnaire, followed by a cooling off period, establishes a pre-existing relationship.  See 
Lamp Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1998 WL 278984 (May 29, 1998); Lamp 
Technologies, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1997 WL 282988 (May 29, 1997); H.B. Shaine 
& Co., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1987 WL 107907 (May 1, 1987); IPONET, SEC No-
Action Letter, 1996 WL 431821 (July 26, 1996).  As a result, today thousands of investors 
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the PIPE offering context, the invocation of the pre-existing relationship 
standard helps to ensure that the subject issuer can uphold the legality of 
the offering if challenged on grounds of general solicitation.74 
3. Rule 506 
Turning to the primary exemption involved in many PIPE offerings, 
Rule 506 of Regulation D75 serves as a “safe harbor” to the Section 4(2) 
can access an issuer’s website, become pre-qualified and accordingly participate in Reg. D 
offerings without the issuer violating the general solicitation ban.  See generally Katherine 
Killingsworth, A History of General Solicitation Under the 1933 Act and Why Additional 
Guidance is Needed for the Future, 33 SEC. REG. L.J. 47, 56-61 (2005) (discussing the 
formation of new pre-existing relationships and the implications of those relationships for 
the existence of a general solicitation); David B.H. Martin, Jr. & L. Keith Parsons, The 
Preexisting Relationship Doctrine Under Regulation D:  A Rule Without Reason?, 45 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1031, 1040-46 (1988) (criticizing the use of the pre-existing 
relationship test). 
 74. With respect to Rule 503, that rule provides that issuers relying on any Reg D 
offering must provide the SEC with notice of such by filing a notice on Form D.  An issuer 
that violates this provision risks the penalty of disqualification from the ability to make 
additional Reg D offerings.  17 C.F.R. § 230.503 (2006).  The SEC recently revised Form 
D.  See Securities Act Release No. 8891 (2008). 
 75. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2006).  Note that other exemptions in Regulation D include 
Rules 504 and 505.  Rule 504 is one of two limited offering transactional exemptions 
adopted by the SEC pursuant to its statutory authority under Section 3(b) of the 1933 Act.  
Essentially, Rule 504 facilitates capital formation by smaller start-up companies and does so 
by providing them with an exemption from the Section 5 registration mandate for offerings 
not exceeding $1 million in any twelve month period.  17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2006).  In 
addition to the monetary limitation, the Rule 504 exemption may be used by issuers that are 
not reporting companies, investment companies or blank check companies.  Further, in a 
Rule 504 exemption there are no limits on the number of investors that can participate, 
investor qualification is not required, and under certain circumstances, restrictions on 
general solicitation and resale are inapplicable.  Under federal law, an issuer relying on the 
Rule 504 exemption is not required to provide specific offering information to investors.  In 
practical effect, if a public Rule 504 offering is conducted, many states require the filing of a 
state registration statement.  See STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 57-58. 
Rule 505 contains an exemption for offerings not exceeding $5 million in any 12-month 
period by issuers to no more than thirty-five non-accredited investors and an unlimited 
number of accredited investors.  17 C.F.R. § 230.505(a).  Rule 505 investors are considered 
accredited if they fall into one of the categories enumerated in Rule 501(a), and, unlike in 
Rule 506 offerings, there is no requirement to qualify non-accredited investors as 
sophisticated.  17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(1)-(2).  Additionally, an issuer is not eligible to rely 
on the Rule 505 offering if it is an investment company or otherwise disqualified according 
to Rule 252.  17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii).  Further, if a Rule 505 offering includes non-
accredited investors, the issuer is obligated to fully comply with Rules 501 and 502.  As 
with Rule 504, the Rule 508 substantial compliance defense is available to Rule 505 issuers 
in certain circumstances.  17 C.F.R. § 230.508(a)(1)-(3) (2006).  Note, however, that the 
Rule 508 substantial compliance test is not available for violations of the ban on general 
solicitation, the limitation on the number of non-accredited investors, or the limitation on 
aggregate offering price.  Id.; see also James R. Tanenbaum & Anna T. Pinedo, The Law:  
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statutory exemption described above.76  Accordingly, if an issuer satisfies 
Rule 506’s requirements, the offering falls within the exemptive scope of 
Section 4(2).  However, unlike the Section 4(2) analysis, which focuses on 
offerees, Rule 506 is generally focused on purchasers.77  Pursuant to Rule 
506, there can be no more than thirty-five non-accredited purchasers and an 
unlimited number of accredited investors.78  Further, while there is no 
express limit on the number of offerees that can be targeted in Rule 506 
transactions, marketing the offering to a large number of prospective 
investors who have no pre-existing relationship with the issuer or financial 
intermediaries may violate the ban on general solicitation and advertising.79  
Additionally, accredited investors participating in a Rule 506 offering are 
irrefutably presumed to be financially sophisticated and to have access to 
registration-type information.  Accordingly, Rule 506 does not require 
delivery of information to accredited purchasers.  Generally, PIPE investors 
in a Rule 506 offering are all accredited purchasers.80 
Legal and Regulatory Framework, in PIPES:  A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC 
EQUITY, supra note 1, at 77, 85 (discussing the Rule 504, 505, and 508 exceptions). 
Importantly, unlike Rule 506 exemption, which is preempted from state regulation, 
§18(b)(4)(D) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(4)(D), the Rule 504 and Rule 505 
exemptions are regulated by the states.  Due to the objectives of avoiding additional costs 
and “overzealous” state regulators, PIPE offerings generally rely on the Rule 506 
exemption. 
 76. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a)(2006) (“Offers and sales of securities by an issuer that 
satisfy the conditions in paragraph (b) of [Rule 506] shall be deemed to be a transaction not 
involving any public offering within the meaning of section 4(2) of the [1933] Act.”). 
 77. An exception to this generalization is Rule 502’s ban on general solicitation and 
advertising.  See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c). 
 78. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2) (2006). 
 79. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(1), 230.502(c) (2006). 
 80. See, e.g., Hicks, supra note 69, at § 1:17 (“an issuer is not required to deliver 
disclosure documents to accredited investors”).  By contrast, with respect to non-accredited 
purchasers, such investors must meet financial sophistication standards and must be 
provided with disclosure of specified information.  17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2).  Note also 
that the substantial compliance defense is available to Rule 506 issuers and accordingly 
affords these issuers more flexibility in satisfying the prerequisites for the exemption.  
However, as with Rule 505, the Rule 508 defense is not available for violations of the ban 
on general solicitation or the number of non-accredited investors.  See 17 C.F.R. § 
508(a)(1)-(a)(3).  Importantly, as stated above, an additional benefit of the Rule 506 offering 
is the preemption of state law regulation that it affords.  See National Securities Markets 
Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (1996).  In order for an 
offering to qualify for preemption of the state securities regulation framework, the securities 
being issued must be considered a “covered security” as defined in Section 18 of the 1933 
Act.  A “covered security” is defined to include securities issued under the Rule 506 
exemption.  See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2006). 
Although not generally used in the PIPE context, there are several other exemptions from 
the registration requirement found in Section 5 of the 1933 Act.  Section 4(6) of the 1933 
Act, for example, is an exemption that reflects Congressional concern that small enterprises 
should not be unduly burdened in the process of raising capital.  See Adoption of Interim 
Notice-Of-Sales Form for Transactions Pursuant to Section 4(6), Securities Act Release No. 
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III. EXAMINING THE PIPELINE 
While traditional financing options theoretically are available to 
smaller publicly held companies, the use of a PIPE may represent the only 
viable financing option for such companies.81  For example, a primary 
public offering may prove impractical due to the lack of investment banker 
interest, insufficiently widespread support for the company or the securities 
to be offered, or the significant expenses that would be incurred.82  
Similarly, many companies are unable to secure conventional debt 
financing either because of their overall credit unworthiness or as a result 
of the current credit market conditions that have constrained the overall 
level at which banks have an appetite to lend.83  Moreover, even assuming 
6256, 1980 WL 25728 (Nov. 7, 1980).  In this regard, Section 4(6) exempts offers and sales 
from Securities Act registration by any issuer solely to “accredited investors” if the total 
amount raised does not exceed the limit articulated in Section 3(b) which is currently set at 
$5,000,000.  While Section 4(6) places no specified limit on the number of investors that 
can participate, all investors must be “accredited.”  Significantly, no general solicitation is 
allowed and the securities issued in a Section 4(6) offering are restricted from resale.  An 
issuer using Section 4(6) does not have to provide investors any specific offering 
information.  Unsurprisingly, the Section 4(6) exemption is not often invoked because 
typically, if an offering is exempt under Section 4(6), it is usually exempt under Rule 506 – 
a more favorable option given the state law preemption Rule 506 affords. 
Other exemptions from Securities Act registration include the intrastate offerings exemption 
(§ 3(a)(11) and Rule 147), the Rule 701 exemption (directed toward privately held business 
issuing securities as compensation to employees and consultants), and Regulation A (that 
allows a non-public company to raise up to $5 million during a twelve-month period by 
conducting a “mini-public” offering).  See STEINBERG, supra note 2, at 56-71 (discussing the 
exemptions just mentioned).  These exemptions are rarely, if ever, employed in the context 
of PIPEs. 
 81. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 382 (noting that PIPEs often represent the only 
available financing option for many small companies). 
 82. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 83. See Jane J. Kim, Where Either a Borrower or a Lender Can Be, WALL ST. J., Mar. 
12, 2008, at D1 (“As the credit crisis spurs traditional lenders to tighten credit standards and 
raise fees, more small-business owners and entrepreneurs are turning to so-called person-to-
person lending networks—with names like Prosper, LendingClub.com and Zopa.com — to 
help keep their businesses going.”); see also The Credit Crisis:  Financial Engine Failure, 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 9, 2008, at 79 (“The extent of America’s economic woes was underlined 
on February 5th when signs of abrupt shrinkage in service industries in January helped push 
the S&P 500 stock market index down by 3.2%, its worst one-day fall in almost a year”).  
The article also found that, according to the most recent Federal Reserve quarterly survey of 
bank-lending officers, “the credit crunch was getting even crunchier” and as a result, “a 
good number of banks had imposed stricter lending standards and higher rates on loans 
since the previous survey, carried out in October [of 2007].  Id.; see also The Credit 
Squeeze:  Abandon Ship—The Credit Squeeze, ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 2007, at 58 (“The 
stockmarket has reacted with alarm to this credit squeeze, partly because it was counting on 
a continuous stream of debt-financed takeovers to push share prices higher.  That confidence 
has now gone, and with it the market’s swagger.”); Credit Markets:  If at First You Don’t 
Succeed, THE ECONOMIST, March 15, 2008 (“The fear is that the financial markets have 
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that these issuers are able to secure the debt financing that they seek, these 
lenders frequently will require the subject company to agree to onerous 
financial and operational covenants—concessions with respect to which the 
company may be unwilling or simply unable to adhere.  Principally as a 
consequence of the foregoing considerations, in recent years, PIPE 
transactions have evolved as an increasingly popular and relatively 
inexpensive capital-raising technique.84  The following discussion provides 
an overview of PIPEs as a transactional alternative to the currently elusive 
traditional sources of capital financing. 
A. PIPEs 101—The Basic Transaction 
As briefly discussed above, a PIPE is generally defined as “any 
privately negotiated equity or equity-linked investment in a public 
company.”85  In a sense, a PIPE is a hybrid transaction that combines 
features of a traditional private placement transaction with a registered 
public offering.86  To illustrate, a PIPE transaction typically begins with the 
consummation of a private placement, normally pursuant to Rule 506 of 
Regulation D.  This private placement effectuates a PIPE purchaser’s direct 
investment into the issuing company.87  Upon completion of the private 
placement and pursuant to the contractual terms negotiated, a subject issuer 
covenants to file a registration statement covering the shares purchased in 
the Rule 506 transaction.88  Given this structural framework, PIPEs have 
achieved popularity because, if executed properly, they can provide an 
issuing company with the ability to raise capital fast and efficiently, while 
simultaneously offering investors the liquidity generally not available in a 
pure private-placement investment.89 
entered a negative spiral, the obverse of the kind of euphoria that drove dotcom stocks to 
absurd valuations in 1999 and early 2000.  The problems are exacerbated by the demise of 
the [securitization] market, and fears about counterparty risk.  Both those factors are making 
banks less willing to lend—even to worthy borrowers.”). 
 84. See E. Kurt Kim, The Marketplace:  A Statistical Summary, in PIPES:  A GUIDE TO 
PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC EQUITY 27 (rev. and updated ed. 2006) (describing the 
evolution of PIPEs into a preferred financing tool from the mid-1990s until 2004). 
 85. Dresner, supra note 1, at 1. 
 86. Lerner, supra note 66, at 655-56. 
 87. Dresner, supra note 1, at 2-3; see also supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text. 
 88. See Jones et al., supra note 10, at 24 (describing the registration requirement 
typically required in a PIPE transaction as “a feature that makes PIPEs particularly 
appealing to private investors because it provides a potentially quicker and easier exit from 
the investment than other forms of private equity financing”). 
 89. See James F. O’Brien, Jr., A Historical Perspective:  The Bubble, Converts, and the 
Birth of Structured PIPEs, in PIPES:  A GUIDE TO PRIVATE INVESTMENTS IN PUBLIC EQUITY, 
at 53-62 (describing the rise in the popularity of PIPEs, which correlated with the rapid 
growth of capital markets during the 1990s); see also Lerner, supra note 66, at 657 
(explaining that PIPEs allow companies to raise more capital than traditional private 
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From a “deal” perspective, a PIPE transaction includes a pure-equity 
or equity-linked investment by the respective investor into the issuing 
company.90  Many issuers prefer this financing alternative because it allows 
them to secure capital without incurring the cost of a publicly registered 
offering up-front.  Moreover, the discount provided in PIPEs to the current 
price for which a subject company’s stock is selling in the public markets is 
more advantageous than the discount generally applicable in a pure private 
placement transaction.  Similarly, PIPEs offer subject issuers additional 
cost savings since these issuers are able to avoid some of the administrative 
and advertising costs associated with traditional public (primary or 
secondary) offerings.91 
From an investor’s perspective, the principal highlight of a PIPE 
transaction is that these investors enjoy a level of liquidity not found in 
traditional straight private placement deals.  Particularly, by requiring an 
issuing company to file and have declared effective a registration statement 
covering the underlying common stock, PIPE investors drastically reduce 
the illiquidity normally associated with generic private placements, thereby 
facilitating a cost-effective exit to their investment.92  Additional benefits 
for PIPE investors include:  (i) their potential for superior returns; and (ii) 
the various other contractual features that enhance the overall security of 
the subject investment.93 
B. PIPEs—Structural Alternatives 
Structurally, a PIPE transaction is the product of a heavily negotiated 
process and as such can take one of a myriad of forms based ultimately on 
the terms of the transaction, the securities involved, and the particularized 
needs of the issuer and investors.94  Nonetheless, there are predominantly 
two forms a PIPE transaction can take:  traditional or structured.95 
In a traditional PIPE, the issuing company covenants to file a 
registration statement covering the applicable securities with the SEC 
investments and to accurately predict the amount of cash that will be raised at the close of 
the transaction). 
 90. Dresner, supra note 1, at 2. 
 91. See Lerner, supra note 66, at 663-64 (noting that PIPEs are often more cost-
effective for issuing companies, in part, because they afford these companies the ability to 
“bypass ‘road shows’” and advertising that are usually required for successful secondary 
public offerings). 
 92. Id. at 662; see also Jones et al., supra note 10, at 24 (explaining the liquidity 
advantages that make PIPEs attractive to private investors). 
 93. Lerner, supra note 66, at 662. 
 94. See Gormley, supra note 15, at 9, 13 (observing that the PIPE investment 
community “remains a highly negotiated marketplace”). 
 95. Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 384. 
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promptly after the closing of the private offering made pursuant to Rule 
506 of Regulation D.  Accordingly, the private placement component is 
consummated before the registration statement covering the securities 
issued pursuant to it is effective.  A traditional PIPE usually involves the 
sale of common stock at a fixed price that is determined in one of three 
ways:  (i) a discount from market price; (ii) a premium to the market price; 
or (iii) at the market price of the company’s common stock.96 
Alternatively, a traditional PIPE may consist of a sale of preferred 
stock which the investor has the option to convert into common stock 
pursuant to a negotiated and fixed conversion ratio.  In a traditional PIPE 
involving preferred stock, the convertible preferred shares may also give 
the investor a right to dividends and similar rights in a sale, merger, or 
liquidation of the issuing company.97  In fact, in many situations where an 
investor receives these additional benefits, the transaction is priced at or 
near the current market prices of the company’s common stock.98  One of 
the primary disadvantages inherent in the traditional PIPE structure is that, 
while the issuer is contractually obligated to file and have a registration 
statement declared effective, this process is subject to the SEC’s regulatory 
scrutiny and can therefore be delayed.99  This, in turn, creates a period of 
illiquidity that is ultimately factored into the investors’ discount on the 
acquired securities.  Additionally, since the private placement portion of 
the traditional PIPE deal is finalized prior to the filing of the registration 
statement, investors are committed to purchase, irrespective of whether 
there is a decline in the issuing company’s stock price in the interim period 
 96. Id.; see Gerald T. Lins et al., Private Investments in Public Equities (PIPEs), in 
HEDGE FUNDS AND OTHER PRIVATE FUNDS:  REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE § 6:39.50 (2007-
2008 ed.) (explaining that the timing of registration statements for these securities allows 
quicker liquidity for investors); see also Harold S. Bloomenthal, Small Businesses–
Additional Regulatory Relief, 30 No. 2 SEC. & FED. CORP. L. REP. 1 (Feb. 2008) (explaining 
the time period that a registration statement becomes effective after filing); Sarah S. Gold & 
Richard L. Spinogatti, Corporate and Securities Litigation:  SEC’s PIPEs Short Sales 
Theory Fails, 239 N.Y.L.J. 3 (col. 1) (Feb. 13, 2008) (noting that PIPEs may be exempt 
from the registration requirements that normally apply to public sales of unregistered 
securities). 
 97. Lerner, supra note 66, at 663. 
 98. Id. at 662. 
 99. See Prior Delivery of Preliminary Prospectus, Securities Act Release No. 4968, 34 
Fed. Reg. 7235 (Apr. 24, 1969) (noting the high volume of registration statements the SEC 
must process); Elimination of Certain Pricing Amendments and Revision of Prospectus 
Filing Procedures, Securities Act Release No. 6714, 52 Fed. Reg. 21252 (May 27, 1987) 
(attempting to simplify the registration process); Simplification of Registration Procedures 
for Primary Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 6964, Exchange Act Release 
No. 31345, 57 Fed. Reg. 48970 (Oct. 22, 1992) (attempting to further reduce delays in the 
registration process); Carl Schneider et al., Going Public:  Practice, Procedure, and 
Consequences, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1, 19-22 (1981) (describing the often frustrating process 
employed by the SEC when it reviews filings). 
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between the private placement’s closing and the registration statement’s 
effectiveness.100 
Similar to the traditional PIPE, the structured PIPE is a transactional 
variety pursuant to which the issuing company generally will sell preferred 
stock or debt securities that are convertible into the company’s common 
stock.101  Unlike the traditional PIPE, in a structured PIPE transaction an 
investor’s obligation to purchase shares may be contingent on a registration 
statement covering those securities being declared effective by the SEC.102  
In such transactions, the closing generally is delayed until the effective date 
of the registration statement.  This enables the PIPE investor to engineer an 
exit strategy for its prospective investment prior to becoming legally 
obligated to acquire the securities. 
In contrast to a traditional PIPE, the conversion price in a structured 
PIPE is usually variable and contractually linked to a reset mechanism that 
automatically adjusts the price downwards if the market price of the 
company’s common stock falls below the conversion or reset price fixed at 
the time of issuance.103  For this reason, a structured PIPE is generally more 
advantageous to PIPE investors because of the price protection afforded by 
the conversion ratio reset mechanism.104 
 100. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 384.  Approximately 83% of the 1,343 PIPE deals 
that closed in 2006 involved traditional PIPEs.  Id. 
 101. See Jones et al., supra note 10, at 24 (noting that structured PIPEs generally involve 
the sale of:  (i) convertible debentures or convertible preferred shares (where the conversion 
price is based on the future market price of the common equity), or (ii) convertible and 
common equity with a reset feature (where the share price or conversion price is reduced at 
a later date if the share price goes below a certain threshold), or (iii) fluctuating convertible 
(where the purchase price is linked to the future market price of the common equity - and as 
a result the securities issued in a structured PIPE frequently represent a larger percentage of 
the issuer’s outstanding share capital than in a traditional PIPE)). 
 102. See Overview:  Private Investment in Public Equity (“PIPES”),  
www.friedlandworldwide.com (July 25, 2005). 
 103. See O’Brien, supra note 89, at 61.  Structured PIPEs often involve a sale of 
variable-priced securities (for example:  floating ratio convertible debt) or a sale of 
securities accompanied by variable-priced sweeteners, which often lead to “toxic PIPES” or 
“death spirals” because these conversion ratios are inherently tied to the performance of the 
underlying stock after the PIPE issuance.  As such, structured PIPEs enable investors to 
convert their PIPE securities into a greater number of issuer shares in the event the issuer’s 
stock performs poorly after the PIPE is announced publicly and thus, arguably protects an 
investment against unexpected price declines that may occur during the period between the 
issuance and the effectiveness of the registration statement.  However, these conversion 
ratios also render structured PIPEs more subject to market manipulation by investors, 
especially when one takes into consideration the aggressive short selling of the underlying 
equity shares that normally occurs during this interim period.  Particularly, this shorting 
activity drives down the price of the issuer’s stock while resulting in a more favorable 
conversion ratio.  The primary problem with this strategy is that it can cause excessive 
dilution which diminishes the value of other existing shareholders’ shares. 
 104. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 384-85 (“[W]ith a structured PIPE, investors do not 
assume price risk during the pendency of the resale registration statement”). 
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Concomitantly, this same feature makes the structured PIPE more 
risky for issuers since the conversion ratio may be calibrated in a way that, 
when triggered by the downward movement of the stock’s price, exposes 
the company’s existing shareholders to a significant risk of dilution.105  The 
dilution risk inherent in structured PIPE transactions is evidenced in the 
PIPE transactional paradigm known as a “death spiral” or “toxic PIPE.”106  
In these infamous PIPE transactions, reset provisions function as generally 
designed to automatically reset the exercise price if the price of the 
underlying stock falls below a contractually established threshold.  As a 
consequence, this extreme downward pressure is placed on the underlying 
PIPE shares, a reality that is often compounded by the aggregate impact of 
investors shorting the stock on the open market.  The cumulative effect of 
this shorting activity places greater downward pressure on the stock’s 
market price, which in turn enables PIPE investors to make higher returns 
pursuant to their automatic reset provisions.107  This downward pressure on 
the stock price, accelerating a dilutive cycle, adversely impacts the issuer’s 
public shareholders.  In sum, “[b]ecause the reset provision rewards the 
[PIPE] investor with more shares to match the original investment, this 
means that the lower the stock price goes, the greater dilution from 
conversion of the preferred, and the less value each common share 
holds.”108  The “death spiral” scenario is partly responsible for the negative 
perception that dominated during the early days of the PIPE’s emergence 
onto the capital financing landscape.109  Nonetheless, more recently, both 
the private and regulatory sectors have responded in a manner that largely 
has relegated the “death spiral” to the proverbial sidelines in the context of 
PIPE transactions.  Thus, while the conditions surrounding these “toxic” 
transactions had deleterious effects on the PIPE market, they also led to 
innovative responses that serve a remedial role in the demise of “death 
spirals.”110 
C.  PIPEs—Market Evolution 
PIPEs emerged onto the investment landscape as a capital financing 
alternative approximately twenty years ago.  During early days, PIPEs were 
regarded as a disfavored financing alternative generally used only by cash-
strapped small-capitalization companies in dire need of financing.  
 105. See Lerner, supra note 66, at 664-66 (describing the toxic PIPE transaction). 
 106. Id. at 657-61. 
 107. See Lerner, supra note 66, at 664-66; Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 385. 
 108. Lerner, supra note 66, at 664. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  The foregoing overview illustrates how a PIPE transaction provides issuers with 
the ability to efficiently raise capital in a targeted, customized manner.  See Gormley, supra 
note 15, at 15. 
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However, as time went on, both the investment community and issuers 
alike began to realize the versatility inherent in the PIPE transactional 
structure and increased the rate at which they resorted to it as a capital-
raising strategy.111  Gaining recognition, PIPEs today have expanded to 
include more established issuers who seek to benefit from the efficiency 
and cost effectiveness that PIPEs bring to the table.112 
D.  PIPEs—Transactional Considerations 
Traditionally, PIPEs have been viewed as an important financing 
alternative for relatively small companies.  In fact, recent estimates indicate 
that smaller companies still represent the largest category of PIPE 
issuers.113  Yet, while micro-cap (i.e., companies with a market 
capitalization of under $250 million) to mid-cap companies (i.e., 
companies with a market capitalization of between one and five billion) 
traditionally have comprised the largest constituency of PIPE issuers, a new 
group of investors, namely hedge funds, are increasingly developing a 
financial appetite for PIPE transactions.  To illustrate, recent estimates 
indicate that hedge funds currently constitute about 80% of the investors in 
micro-cap PIPEs.  PIPEs are attractive to hedge funds because they provide 
an optimal transactional context in which these funds can leverage their 
technical expertise by using sophisticated trading strategies.  Hedge funds 
often use a strategy whereby they sell short the issuing company’s common 
stock promptly after a PIPE deal is closed.  By using this strategy, hedge 
funds may effectively lock in the purchase discount, thereby profiting 
irrespective of a rise or fall in the issuer’s share price.114 
However, this portrayal of hedge funds being able to effortlessly reap 
the benefit of PIPE transactions is often not the reality.  Specifically, in 
order to execute their short-selling strategy, hedge funds must be able to 
secure (normally through borrowing) shares to cover their short position.  
At times, the strategy has been impeded because some PIPE issuers have 
thinly-traded stock, and consequently, investing hedge funds trading in 
such PIPE shares may not be able to find enough shares to cover their short 
positions.115  That deficiency has prompted some hedge funds to rely on 
what are known as “naked shorts.”116  The SEC, displeased with this 
 111. See id. (describing the growth of the PIPE market as a financing option). 
 112. Id. at 19. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 387. 
 115. Id. at 388. 
 116. According to the SEC, “[i]n a ‘naked’ short sale, the seller does not borrow or 
arrange to borrow the securities in time to make delivery to the buyer within the standard 
three-day settlement period.  As a result, the seller fails to deliver securities to the buyer 
when delivery is due; this is known as a ‘failure to deliver’ or ‘fail.’”  Naked Short Sales, 
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allegedly illegal strategy, has stepped up its regulatory oversight of hedge 
funds in the PIPE arena accordingly.117 
Like any complex business transaction, a PIPE “deal” is completed by 
the execution of a number of different agreements, including:  (i) a 
Securities Purchase Agreement; (ii) a Registration Rights Agreement; (iii) a 
Warrant Agreement (assuming applicability); and (iv) a Legal Opinion.  
Generally, after the completion of the preliminary and subsequent 
negotiation phases of the PIPE offering, the issuer and investors will agree 
on final versions of the foregoing agreements described above and execute 
them.  Subsequent to the closing, the company will endeavor to prepare and 
file a registration statement covering the securities, thereby enabling the 
non-affiliated investors to freely resell the securities.  Usually, the issuer 
will be required to file the registration statement anywhere between 90 and 
120 days after the closing of the PIPE transaction.  In most cases, the issuer 
will be contractually obligated to use its best efforts to have the registration 
statement declared effective by the SEC, an event that constitutes the 
consummation of the PIPE transaction.118 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/nakedshortsale.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2008). 
 117. For example, in SEC v. Langley Partners, L.P., Langley Partners, North Olmsted 
Partners and Quantico Partners (collectively, “Langley”) and their portfolio manager, 
Jeffrey Thorp (“Thorp”), established naked short positions in a PIPE issuer through Langley 
Partners’ Canadian broker-dealer prior to the effective date of the resale registration 
statement covering the underlying PIPE shares.  In order to cover its short positions, 
Langley Partners either:  (i) directly transferred its PIPE shares to its Canadian account or 
instructed its Canadian broker to sell its PIPE shares on a particular exchange and buy the 
same number of shares at the same time and price on the same exchange, (ii) journaled its 
PIPE shares from its cash account at its prime broker to its short account with instructions to 
cover its short position, or (iii) used cooperating market makers to purchase the PIPE shares 
from Langley Partners and then sell the shares back to Langley Partners, where the 
“washed” shares were used to cover the short position.  The SEC charged Thorp with a 
violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act, alleging that he covered the pre-effective date 
short positions with shares he received in the PIPE transaction (or with “washed” shares) 
and “shares used to cover a short sale are deemed to have been sold when the short sale was 
made.”  Thus, the SEC alleged that “Thorp and Langley employed an unlawful trading 
strategy in violation of the antifraud and registration provisions of the federal securities 
laws.”  Complaint, SEC v. Langley Partners, L.P., No. 1:06CV00467 (D.D.C. 2006); see 
also In re Spinner Asset Mgmt., LLC and Spinner Global Tech. Fund, Ltd., Securities Act 
Release No. 8763 (Dec. 20, 2006) (alleging that a company placed matching buy and sell 
orders with respect to the PIPE shares in order to “make it appear that [it] was covering the 
short positions with open market shares,” and as such violated Section 5 of the 1933 Act); 
Complaint, SEC v. Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., No. 06-CV-02160 (D.D.C 2006) 
(alleging that a violation of Section 5 of the 1933 Act occurred where FBR sold shares short 
prior to effectiveness of PIPE issuer’s registration statement, purchased the PIPE shares 
from FBR clients that invested in the PIPE and then used the shares to cover its preexisting 
short position). 
 118. While a PIPE issuer’s obligation to have the SEC find effectiveness after the 
registration statement is generally limited, the issuing company will generally be required to 
keep the registration statement current during the entire time that the PIPE investors are 
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IV. RECENT REGULATORY DEVELOPMENTS IMPACTING PIPES 
While the foregoing discussion highlights PIPEs as a relatively 
inexpensive and effective alternative that enables a company to attain 
capital financing, there are a number of recent regulatory developments that 
have impacted the vitality of the PIPE market.  This section of the article 
discusses these developments and assesses their overall cumulative impact 
on the PIPE market. 
A. Potentially Positive Developments 
1. Rule 144 Amendments 
Recently, the SEC comprehensively amended Rule 144 in a manner 
that may benefit PIPE transactions.119  In particular, the SEC shortened the 
holding period requirement under Rule 144 for “restricted securities” of 
issuers that are subject to the Exchange Act reporting requirements.  
Pursuant to the recent amendments, the new six-month holding period 
requirement (from the previous one-year period) will apply to the securities 
of an issuer that has been subject to the reporting requirements of Section 
13 or 15(d) of the 1934 Exchange Act for a period of at least 90 days 
before the Rule 144 sale.120  In amending the Rule, the SEC stated that a 
core objective of Rule 144 is to provide clear and objective criteria for 
actively engaged in the reselling of their restricted securities pursuant to the registration 
statement.  See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 393-95. 
 119. Revisions to Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act Release No. 33-8869, 72 Fed. Reg. 
71,546 (Dec. 17, 2007) (hereinafter “Rule 144 Release”]. 
 120. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144 (2006) (addressing the calculation of the holding period 
of restricted securities).  Note that the issuer must continue to provide Exchange Act 
periodic reports for an additional six-month period.  Rule 144 Release, supra note 118, at 
71,550.  Restricted securities of a “non-reporting issuer” will continue to be subject to a 
one-year holding period requirement.  Id. at 71,549.  A non-reporting issuer is one that is 
not, or has not been for a period of at least 90 days before the Rule 144 sale, subject to the 
reporting requirements of Section 13 or 15(d) of the Exchange Act.  Id. at 71,568.  The SEC 
believes that different holding periods for reporting and non-reporting issuers are 
appropriate given that reporting issuers have an obligation to file periodic reports with 
updated financial information (including audited financial information in annual filings that 
are publicly available on EDGAR, the Commission’s electronic filing system).  Id. at 
71,549.  In 2006, the volume of transactions filed under Rule 144 exceeded $71 billion, and 
more than 50% of U.S. public companies, large and small alike, every year have had at least 
one transaction reported on Form 144.  Id. at 71,562.  As such, decreasing the regulatory 
burdens associated with these transactions will ultimately reduce the cost of capital to these 
companies.  Id. Note, moreover, that with respect to restricted securities of non-reporting 
companies, a non-affiliate can freely resell all of its holdings (not subject to a volume 
limitation) after a one-year holding period.  Id. at 71,550.  This is an expansion from the 
previous two-year period.  
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determining whether a person reselling securities initially acquired in a 
transaction that rendered them restricted did so with impermissible 
distributive intent.  In this regard, the Rule 144 holding period has 
traditionally been a key criterion established to demonstrate that a selling 
security holder did not acquire the securities sought to be sold under Rule 
144 with impermissible distributive intent.  The SEC further asserted that 
reducing the holding period to the new six-month requirement would 
remove unnecessary impediments to the process of capital formation and 
will, as a result, have an overall beneficial impact on the private placement 
market.121  Indeed, most commentators that have opined on the overall 
impact of the recent amendments have observed that the new holding 
period will increase the liquidity of privately sold securities and decrease 
the cost of capital for reporting issuers.122  Indeed, the SEC’s endorsement 
of the six-month holding period illustrates the Commission’s commitment 
to the implementation of rules that help companies, especially smaller 
companies, raise capital more efficiently and less expensively.123 
Nonetheless, two commentators, namely the North American 
Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) and one of these 
authors124 take the position that the SEC’s six-month holding period is 
unduly short and makes a mockery of existing case law.  For example, in 
United States v. Sherwood,125 the federal district court applied a two-year 
holding period as a crude rule of thumb to determine whether the subject 
shareholder took with distributive intent.126  In adopting Rule 144 in 1972, 
 121. See Rule 144 Release, supra note 119, at 71,549 (stating that the SEC did “not want 
the holding period to be longer than necessary or impose any unnecessary costs or 
restrictions on capital formation” and that “[a]fter observing the operation of Rule 144 since 
the 1997 amendments, [the SEC] believe[s] that a six-month holding period for securities of 
reporting issuers provides a reasonable indication that an investor has assumed the economic 
risk of investment in the securities”). 
 122. Chivers & Cole, 144A Offerings—Potential New Liquidity Option for Sponsors 
(Dec. 2007), http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=8504. 
 123. According to the SEC, “by making private offerings more attractive, the 
amendments may allow some companies to avoid certain types of costly financing structures 
involving the issuance of extremely dilutive convertible securities”).  SEC Release, supra 
note 119. 
 124. See Rule 144 Release, supra note 119, at 71,548 n.32 (noting NASAA and Marc I. 
Steinberg). 
 125. United States v. Sherwood, 175 F. Supp. 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
 126. Id. at 483 (“The passage of two years before the commencement of distribution of 
any of these shares is an insuperable obstacle to my finding that Sherwood took these shares 
with a view to distribution thereof, in the absence of any relevant evidence from which I 
could conclude he did not take the shares for investment.”); see also SEC v. Kern, 425 F.3d 
143, 148-50 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding a violation of Rule 144(k) when a seller of unregistered 
securities failed to allow two years to elapse between acquiring securities from the issuer 
and the execution of subsequent sales). 
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the SEC held firm to this two-year holding period.127  Over the years, 
through amendments to Rule 144, the Commission has decreased the two-
year period to as short as six months.128  Nowhere does the Commission 
 127. Definition of Terms “Underwriter” and “Brokers’ Transactions,” Security Act 
Release No. 5223, 37 Fed. Reg. 591, 593 (January 14, 1972).  In that release, the SEC 
stated: 
[A] holding period prior to resale [of restricted securities] is essential, among 
other reasons, to assure that those persons who buy [such securities in offerings 
exempt from registration] have assumed the economic risks of investment, and 
therefore, are not acting as conduits for sale to the public of unregistered 
securities, directly or indirectly, on behalf of an issuer.  It should be noted that 
there is nothing in Section 2(11) which places a time limit on a person’s status 
as an underwriter.  The public has the same need for protection afforded by 
registration whether the securities are distributed shortly after their purchase or 
after a considerable length of time. 
. . . . 
[Restricted] [s]ecurities sold in reliance upon the rule must have been 
beneficially owned and fully paid for by the seller for a holding period of at 
least 2 years prior to his sale as specified below.  This condition is designed to 
assure that the registration provisions of the Act are not circumvented by 
persons acting, directly or indirectly, as conduits for an issuer in connection 
with resales of restricted securities.  In order to accomplish this, the rule 
provides that such persons be subject to the full economic risks of the 
investment during the holding period . . . . 
Id. at 593; see also Marc I. Steinberg & Joseph P. Kempler, The Application and 
Effectiveness of SEC Rule 144, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 482 (1988) (addressing the two year 
holding requirement for restricted securities). 
 128. See Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and 145, Securities Act 
Release No. 7390, 63 SEC Docket 2077, at 1-2 (Feb. 20, 1997) (explaining the SEC’s 
decision to shorten the holding periods for restricted securities).  In that release, the 
Commission stated: 
Today, for the first time since the adoption of Rule 144 in 1972, the 
Commission is adopting amendments to shorten the holding period that must be 
satisfied before limited resales of restricted securities may be made by affiliates 
and non-affiliates in reliance upon the rule.  As had been proposed, the 
amendments reduce that holding period from two years to one year.  Also as 
proposed, the amendments reduce the length of the holding period that non-
affiliates must hold restricted securities before making unlimited resales of such 
securities from three years to two years. 
The Commission is adopting the shortened holding periods based on its more 
than 20 years of experience with Rule 144 and the favorable public comments 
received on the 1995 Release.  Shorter holding periods should reduce the cost of 
capital.  This particularly should benefit smaller companies, which often sell 
securities in private placements.  A shorter holding period should lower the 
illiquidity discount given by companies raising capital in private placements and 
increase the usefulness of the Rule 144 safe harbor. 
. . .  The Commission believes that the shorter holding periods will not diminish 
investor protection, since they are sufficiently long to ensure that resales under 
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adequately explain how this new policy squares with established case law.  
Neither does the SEC reasonably set forth how this drastic shortening of 
the Rule 144 holding period promotes investor protection.  Indeed, non-
affiliates of non-reporting companies today can reload all of their holdings 
after a one-year holding period, with little information being available in 
the public domain.129   Such lack of transparency in public markets may be 
Rule 144 will not facilitate indirect public distributions of unregistered 
securities by issuers or affiliates. 
Id. at 2.  See generally Rule 144 Release, supra note 119. 
 129. Generally, Rule 15c2-11 prohibits broker-dealers from publishing a quotation for 
any security unless specified information is available with respect to the issuer and the 
security.  In effect, the rule prevents the widespread distribution of securities without certain 
minimal information being publicly available.  Hence, Rule 15c2-11(a)(5) calls for the 
following information to be reasonably current and to be made reasonably available by the 
subject broker or dealer upon the request of a prospective purchaser: 
(i) the exact name of the issuer and its predecessor (if any); 
(ii) the address of its principal executive offices; 
(iii) the state of incorporation, if it is a corporation; 
(iv) the exact title and class of the security; 
(v) the par or stated value of the security; 
(vi) the number of shares or total amount of the securities outstanding as of the 
end of the issuer’s most recent fiscal year; 
(vii) the name and address of the transfer agent; 
(viii) the nature of the issuer’s businesses; 
(ix) the nature of products or services offered; 
(x) the nature and extent of the issuer’s facilities; 
(xi) the name of the chief executive officer and members of the board of 
directors; 
(xii) the issuer’s most recent balance sheet and profit and loss and retained 
earnings statements; 
(xiii) similar financial information for such part of the two preceding fiscal 
years as the issuer or its predecessor has been in existence; 
(xiv) whether the broker or dealer or any associated person is affiliated, directly 
or indirectly, with the issuer; 
(xv) whether the quotation is being published or submitted on behalf of any 
other broker or dealer, and, if so, the name of such broker or dealer; and 
(xvi) whether the quotation is being submitted or published directly or indirectly 
on behalf of the issuer, or any director, officer or any person, directly or 
indirectly the beneficial owner of more than 10 percent of the outstanding units 
or shares of any equity security of the issuer, and, if so, the name of such 
person, and the basis for any exemption under the federal securities laws for any 
sales of such securities on behalf of such person. 
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viewed as antithetical to the best interests of the investing public.130 
Nonetheless, one significant aspect of the recent Rule 144 
amendments that will likely benefit certain PIPE investors is the SEC’s 
decision not to adopt a proposed amendment that would have included a 
tolling provision.  This tolling provision would have tolled or suspended 
the holding period for a security holder that maintained a short position in, 
or any put or other option to dispose of, the security equivalent to the 
restricted securities owned by the security holder.  This particular 
amendment was originally proposed based on the SEC’s concern over the 
effect of hedging activities that are designed to shift the economic risk of 
investment away from the security holder in the context of PIPE 
transactions.131  However, after considering the comment letters received 
on this topic, the SEC decided against adopting the proposed tolling 
provision.  In doing so, the Commission noted that “in the current 
environment, the tolling provision would unduly complicate Rule 144 and 
could require security holders or brokers to incur significant costs to 
monitor hedging positions for purposes of determining whether they have 
met the holding period requirement.”132  The SEC further noted that 
adopting the proposed tolling provision would likely frustrate the 
Commission’s objective of streamlining Rule 144, seeking to reduce the 
costs associated with capital formation for re 133
In sum, the recent changes to Rule 144 will likely have a beneficial 
impact on PIPE transactions.  These amendments reduce the regulatory 
requirements for the resale of securities and, to a large extent, simplify the 
process of reselling such securities.134  Prior to the amendments, a security 
holder relying on the Rule 144 safe harbor for the resale of restricted 
securities was required to wait at least one year after the securities were last 
sold by the issuer or an affiliate before such securities could be legally sold 
under Rule 144.  The recent Rule 144 amendments have reduced this 
holding period requirement to six months for the resale of restricted 
securities of Exchange Act reporting companies.  One instant benefit that 
this change will have in the context of PIPE transactions is that it will 
increase the liquidity of securities sold in private transactions—a vital 
component of every PIPE transaction.  Another benefit is that enhanced 
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11. 
 130. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Administrative, 
Enforcement, and Legislative Programs and Policies–Their Influence on Corporate Internal 
Affairs, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173 (1982) (making this point with respect to other SEC 
actions).  Please note that Mr. Obi does not concur in this paragraph of the article. 
 131. Rule 144 Release, supra note 119, 72 Fed. Reg. at 71,566. 
 132. Id. at 71,552. 
 133. Id. 
 134. The SEC nonetheless observed that it “will revisit the issue if [it] observe[s] abuse 
relating to the hedging activities of holders of restricted securities.”  Id. 
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pricing efficiency should ensue, to the extent that companies will now be 
able to sell securities in private offerings at prices closer to those that can 
be procured in the public markets, without the costs incurred in a traditional 
registered SEC offering.  As a result, the Rule 144 amendments should 
further facilitate a subject company’s ability to raise capital in private 
securities transactions through the effective and strategic use of PIPEs.135 
2.  SEC Enforcement Actions 
As briefly mentioned above, the SEC staff has recently elevated its 
regulatory oversight of certain PIPE transactions and the PIPE market as a 
whole.  Due to the increasing complexity and prevalence of PIPE 
transactions,136 the Commission’s concern focuses on the possibility of 
investor abuse inherent in the PIPE transactional landscape.  In fact, the 
SEC’s recent regulatory activity in this context is premised on well-
documented abuses in the PIPEs context, particularly the risk that the 
issuance of a large number of shares through a private offering can flood 
the market and have the unfortunate effect of diluting the value of shares 
held by other shareholders of the issuing company.137  Based on this 
concern, the SEC has sought to reign in PIPE transactions and the PIPE 
market as a whole.  A key component of the SEC’s recent regulatory 
arsenal against PIPEs is the initiation of enforcement actions based on 
alleged Section 5 registration violations.  The following discussion will 
illustrate that recent cases have questioned the ultimate viability of the 
SEC’s Section 5 claims in this context, a result arguably beneficial to the 
PIPE market and its participants. 
One of the most recent of the various regulatory tactics that has been 
employed by the SEC in connection with PIPEs is the use of enforcement 
actions premised on alleged Section 5 registration violations.138  Since 
applicable securities laws provide that, absent an exemption, a security 
must be sold in compliance with the Section 5 registration requirement, i.e., 
a registration statement is filed by the issuer and subsequently declared 
effective by the SEC, PIPE shares normally are issued pursuant to the Rule 
506 exemption.139  In a number of recent actions, the Commission has 
 135. See Max Frumes, SEC Shortens, Grandfathers Rule 144 Holding Funds, 5 PIPEs 
Report No. 22, at 1 (Dec. 18, 2007). 
 136. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
 137. See Gold & Spinogatta, supra note 96, at 3 (“[PIPE enforcement] actions are part of 
the SEC’s aggressive enforcement effort aimed at perceived abuses involving PIPE 
transactions”). 
 138. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 407-07. 
 139. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text.  The reliance of PIPE issuers on an 
applicable exemption is a factor that often leads PIPE issuing companies to require PIPE 
investors to contractually pledge that they will refrain from immediately selling or otherwise 
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asserted that short sales effected in connection with PIPE transactions 
constitute Section 5 violations “because shares used to cover a short sale 
are deemed to have been sold when the short sale was made.”140  The locus 
of the SEC’s argument in these cases is not that the basic short selling 
activity itself is illegal.  Rather, the SEC’s position, as articulated in several 
of these cases, is that PIPE investors violate federal securities laws when 
they use the actual restricted PIPE shares, as opposed to the respective 
companies existing unrestricted non-PIPE shares, to cover or otherwise 
close their short positions irrespective of the fact that a registration 
statement covering the subject shares had been declared effective prior to 
the covering.  The critical analytical issue underlying the SEC’s position is 
the question of whether the commencement of a short sale of PIPE shares 
during the pendency of the registration statement constitutes a sale for 
purposes of determining compliance with applicable Section 5 
requirements. 
The Commission’s perspective is that such execution of a short 
position indeed constitutes a sale for Section 5 purposes.  The first part of 
its analysis usually begins with the assertion that the subject securities were 
sold pursuant to a private placement exemption and were thus restricted 
from resale.  Consequently, these securities could only be resold if they 
were registered with the SEC or an available exemption from registration is 
perfected.141  The SEC thereupon asserts that the defendant sold PIPE 
shares into the market prior to the subject registration statement being 
declared effective in strict contravention of the proscriptions found in 
Section 5.142  The Commission posits that the subject defendants 
distributing PIPE shares in a manner that would jeopardize the continuing availability of the 
applicable exemption.  See Gold & Spinogatti, supra note 96, at 3 (noting that “PIPE issuers 
customarily require investors to pledge that they will refrain from immediately 
redistributing their PIPE shares to the public in order to ensure the applicability of that 
exemption”). 
 140. See infra note 148 and accompanying text; see also Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 404.  
In practice, this often happens because investors want to hedge their investment during the 
period between the acquisition of the restricted shares and the effective date of the 
registration statement by selling short a corresponding number of the PIPE issuer’s publicly-
traded securities.  A conventional short sale is when an investor sells a security that he does 
not own by borrowing the security, typically from a broker, and at a later date the investor 
closes out the short position by purchasing the security and returning it to the lender.  See 17 
C.F.R. § 242.200(a) (2006). 
 141. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1) (exempting from § 5 “transactions by any person other than an 
issuer, underwriter, or dealer”).  Section 2(a)(11) of the Securities Act defines the term 
“underwriter,” among other things, as “any person who has purchased from an issuer with a 
view to . . . the distribution of any security.” But see 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(a)(3) (setting forth 
conditions under which a person who sells restricted securities “shall be deemed not to be 
engaged in a distribution of such securities and therefore not to be an underwriter thereof 
within the meaning of Section 2(a)(11) of the [Securities] Act”). 
 142. See, e.g., Complaint, SEC v. Spiegel, Inc., No. 03C-1685, 2003 U.S. Dist. 17933 
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accordingly are selling PIPE shares in an unregistered manner not 
compliant with Rule 144 and are therefore presumed to be underwriters, 
and are thereby unable to avail themselves of the protection afforded by the 
Section 4(1) exemption.  In the SEC’s view, because these PIPE investors 
effectuated short sales that were not registered or privately placed via the 
perfection of an applicable exemption, their transactions, in essence, 
violated Section 5.143 
It has been suggested that, while the SEC’s recent approach to short 
selling in this context may arguably have some theoretical substantive 
merit, it has anomalous practical effects, particularly since this regulatory 
interpretation does not advance the disclosure objectives underlying the 
Section 5 registration requirement.144  Similarly, while the SEC’s position 
on PIPE short sales as it relates to the Section 5 registration requirement is 
based on the perception that to do otherwise would enable hedging PIPE 
investors to inappropriately insulate their transactions from market risk, 
this rationale may be flawed because it infuses a formidable, yet 
unnecessary, regulatory impediment that constricts an investor’s ability to 
utilize generally permitted trading strategies in the context of PIPE 
transactions.145  Additionally, and indeed, somewhat inconsistent with the 
foregoing rationale, the SEC, in fact, has given its approbation to hedging 
in connection with PIPE transactions.146 
(N.D. IL 2003) at 6 available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/compl8020.htm. 
 143. While the foregoing may indicate that the SEC has banned hedging in connection 
with PIPE transactions, this is actually not accurate.  See Spinner Asset Management, LLC, 
SEC Order, Securities Act Release No. 2573 (Dec. 20, 2006) available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/33-8763.pdf.  In fact, in the foregoing recent 
administrative order the SEC articulated its position on the issue as follows: 
Many PIPE investors ‘hedge’ their investment by selling short the PIPE issuer’s 
securities before the resale registration statement is declared effective.  There is 
nothing per se illegal about ‘hedging’ a PIPE investment by selling short the 
issuer’s securities.  Such short sales do not violate the registration provisions of 
the Securities Act if, among other things, the investor closes out the short 
position with shares purchased in the open market. 
 144. See SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  In this context the court 
found that “[i]n addition to its inherent logical implausibility, the SEC’s characterization of 
a short sale does not advance the purposes that animate Section 5’s registration 
requirement.”  Id. at 455 (citing Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 638 (noting that “[t]he 
primary purposes of the Securities Act is to protect investors by requiring publication of 
material information thought necessary to allow them to make informed investment decision 
concerning public offerings of securities in interstate commerce.”)). 
 145. See Sjostrom, supra note 16, at 407-08 (arguing that there are at least two additional 
problems with the SEC’s justification in this regard:  (i) Section 5 is primarily concerned 
about ensuring adequate disclosure, not preventing investors from avoiding market risk and 
(ii) the SEC allows PIPE investors to avoid market risk by short selling so long as the short 
position is covered by shares purchased in the open market). 
 146. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
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Notwithstanding the SEC’s reliance on Section 5 as a regulatory 
sword in the PIPE context, a number of recent cases have squarely called 
into question the viability of the SEC’s Section 5 interpretation as applied 
to PIPE transactions where investors hedge using short sales or similar 
transactions.147  For example, in SEC v. Mangan the SEC filed an action 
against former Friedman, Billings, Ramsey & Co., Inc. registered 
representative John F. Mangan Jr. alleging, among other things, the sale of 
unregistered securities in violation of Section 5 and in connection with 
certain PIPE transactions.  According to the complaint, Mangan allegedly 
purchased 80,000 shares of a Nasdaq-listed company, CompuDyne Corp., 
in a PIPE transaction.  Similar to many other PIPE investors, the defendant 
in this case then hedged the PIPE shares by selling short an equal number 
of CompuDyne shares.  The complaint further alleged that, subsequent to 
the private placement, CompuDyne filed a registration statement for the 
resale of its PIPE shares, and after this registration statement was declared 
effective, Mangan allegedly used the PIPE shares to cover his short 
position in the company’s stock.  The gravamen of the SEC’s complaint 
was the contention that Mangan’s short sales were equivalent to actionable 
violations of Section 5.  Interestingly, unlike several other SEC 
enforcement actions in this area,148 the SEC did not allege that Mangan’s 
short sales were executed through “matched orders,”149 “wash sales,”150 or 
“naked,”151 shorts—transactions the SEC has historically seen as 
evidencing a deceptive intent.  Rather, the SEC primarily alleged that 
Mangan violated Section 5 by engaging in a hedging strategy that consisted 
of him covering his pre-effective short positions with PIPE shares.152 
 147. SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); Complaint, SEC v. Mangan, 
2006 WL 4036641, No. 06-0531 (W.D.N.C. Dec. 28, 2006); Complaint, SEC v. Berlacher, 
No. 07-3800 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 13, 2007). 
 148. See Langley Partners, supra note 117 (alleging unlawful trading strategy involving 
washed shares).  Note that the SEC has initiated several enforcement actions based on 
alleged insider trading in the PIPE setting.  See, e.g., SEC v. Deephaven Capital 
Management, LLC, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 19683 (D.D.C. 2006); SEC v. Shane, SEC Press Rel. 
No. 2005-76 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); SEC v. Pollet, SEC Lit. Rel. No. 19199 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).  
See generally WILLIAM H. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING (2d ed. 2005). 
 149. “Marched orders” are a illegal manipulative technique of offsetting buy and sell 
orders to create the impression of activity in a security, thereby causing upward price 
movement that benefits the participants in the scheme.  See, e.g., SEC v. Lybrand, 200 F. 
Supp. 2d 384, 389-90 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 150. According to the SEC’s articulation, a “wash sale” is when an investor buys and 
sells the same security at the same time or within a short period of time.  Wash sales violate 
the federal securities laws, specifically Section 9(a)(1)(A) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, if they are done to create the false or misleading appearance of 
active trading in a security.  See SEC, Wash Sales, www.sec.gov/answers/wash.htm (last 
visited Sept. 17, 2008). 
 151. See supra note 116. 
 152. This case is in line with several enforcement actions brought against PIPE investors 
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In dismissing the SEC’s complaint, the federal district judge in 
Mangan concluded: 
The government’s allegation of a Section 5 violation is certainly 
creative.  And while there seems little doubt that the defendant 
sold short anticipating the receipt of PIPE shares to cover the 
short, it’s also true that in any case he would have had to cover 
with the shares purchased in the open market should the PIPE fail 
to close or been withdrawn or otherwise not be available to 
produce those shares.  Anybody who bought at the sale of the 
securities got CompuDyne.  They got what they bought.153 
The Mangan decision, particularly its unequivocal rejection of the 
imposition of Section 5 liability based on such short selling activity, has 
been followed by at least two other courts.154 
by the SEC starting in 2005.  In most of these cases, the SEC’s primary basis for action has 
been consistently predicated on the argument that short shares executed prior to the effective 
date of a registration statement were effectively unregistered and non-exempt sales of 
securities if the short positions where subsequently covered by the PIPE shares after the 
registration statement was declared effective.  See supra notes 138-151 and accompanying 
text; infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Transcript of Proceedings before the Honorable Graham C. Mullen, United 
States District Court Judge October 24, 2007, at 43-44, SEC v. Mangan (No. 3:06-CV-531); 
see also SEC v. Mangan, 2007 WL 4102743 (W.D.N.C. 2007) (dismissing SEC’s Section 5 
claim for “the reasons stated in open court during the hearing”). 
 154. SEC v. Lyon, 529 F. Supp. 2d 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); SEC v. Berlacher, 40 SEC. REG 
& L. REP. (BNA) 149 (E.D. Pa. 2008).  For example, in Lyon, during the period from 2001 
to 2004, affiliates of hedge fund Gryphon Management Partners (collectively herein, 
“Gryphon”) participated in approximately thirty-six (36) PIPE transactions.  The SEC 
brought an action in which it alleged that Gryphon (i) violated Section 5 of the 1933 Act; 
(ii) committed securities fraud in violation of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act; and (iii) 
committed insider trading in violation of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.  529 F. Supp. 2d at 
447. 
The first charge brought against Gryphon was a violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act.  
According to the SEC’s theory in this case, Gryphon unlawfully sold PIPE shares to the 
public via a multi-step veiled process which effectively amounted to an unregistered three-
step distribution as follows:  first, Gryphon bought PIPE shares issued by publicly-traded 
companies that were restricted from being sold in the open market; second, it sold short the 
PIPE issuer’s public shares prior to the effective date of a resale registration statement for 
the PIPE shares; and, finally, after the resale registration statements for the PIPE shares 
became effective, Gryphon covered its short positions with the newly-registered PIPE 
shares.  Id. at 448. 
The SEC contended that Gryphon’s process, particularly its hedging activity, violated 
Section 5.  As noted above, the heart of a Section 5 violation where a short sale is involved 
generally involves the determination of what security was sold when a purchaser enters into 
its short position.  Here, the SEC contended that the unregistered PIPE shares shorted by 
Gryphon in some of its PIPE transactions were actually sold when Gryphon entered into its 
short position and thus Section 5 was violated through the public sale of unregistered shares.  
Disagreeing with the Commission’s position, the court held that a short sale of a security 
constitutes a sale of that security and, as such, how an investor subsequently chooses to 
close the corresponding short position in her trading account does not alter the nature of that 
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The SEC’s invocation of Section 5 in this factual context against 
hedging PIPE investors increases the uncertainty inherent in PIPE 
transactions and dissuades such investors from employing effective risk 
management trading strategies.  PIPE issuers are similarly impacted 
because they may be compelled to compensate investors for this increased 
regulatory risk and its attendant costs through higher discounts and other 
contractual benefits.  Hopefully, in light of recent judicial rejection of its 
position, the SEC will revisit its enforcement policies as they pertain to the 
application of Section 5 to short sales executed in connection with PIPE 
transactions.155 
sale.  As a corollary to this point, the court also noted that the SEC’s claims were void of 
any allegations that the defendants’ actions prevented the short sale counterparties from 
accessing or otherwise acquiring the type of information required by the 1933 Act.  In 
reaching this decision, the Court dismissed two telephone interpretations published by the 
SEC staff, one of which the Court acknowledged was consistent with the SEC’s position in 
the litigation but which the Court determined was conclusory and contained no analysis.  Id. 
at 454-59. 
Thus, similar to the Mangan court, the court here rejected the SEC position and found that 
“[b]ecause construing a short sale as a sale of the security that is eventually used to close 
down the short position neither comports with the plain textual meaning of section 5 nor 
advances the statute’s underlying purpose, the Court declines to apply that characterization 
of a short sale to the transactions at issue in [the] litigation.”  Id. at 455.  In sum, the court 
found the SEC’s argument “implausible” as well as unnecessary to achieve the critical 
investor protection objectives underlying Section 5, and not compelled by SEC precedent.  
Accordingly, the court dismissed the claims related to the violation of Section 5 of the 1933 
Act.  Id. at 459-60. 
Similarly, in SEC v. Berlacher, the Commission’s attempt to hold a hedge fund manager and 
several related parties liable for alleged violations of the Securities Act registration 
requirements in connection with short sales involving several PIPE transactions was 
rejected.  As in the Lyon and Mangan cases previously discussed, the SEC here alleged that 
Berlacher and several of his related funds (collectively, “Berlacher”) engaged in a 
manipulative trading scheme that relied on short selling shares that were being issued in 
certain PIPE transactions in which they participated.  In particular, the SEC argued that after 
entering into or otherwise becoming aware of a PIPE transaction, Berlacher would “short” 
the issuer’s stock.  Then, subsequent to the SEC’s declaration that the resale registration 
statement was effective, Berlacher would use previously restricted PIPE shares to cover 
their short positions—a course of action which is, in the SEC’s perspective, prohibited by 
Section 5 of the 1933 Act.  Reaching the same conclusion as that in Lyon and Mangan, the 
court dismissed the Section 5 claims.  40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 149 (E.D. Pa. 2008). 
 155. Another regulatory approach employed by the SEC in the PIPEs context has 
manifested itself in the form of insider trading and securities fraud clams predicated on 
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act that stem from certain contractual restrictions that are 
frequently imposed on PIPE investors.  In particular, PIPE securities offered by a subject 
issuer are generally exempt from Section 5 registration because they are issued pursuant to 
an exemption for nonpublic offerings such as Rule 506 of Regulation D.  However, in order 
to qualify for the exemption, PIPE issuers often require purchasers to represent that, among 
other things, they do not have a present intention to distribute the PIPE securities they are 
purchasing and will refrain from doing so during the pendency of the registration statement.  
Based on these representations, the SEC has argued that short sales executed during the 
interim period in which the registration statement is pending evidence an intention to 
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B. Form S-3 Developments 
1. Form S-3 Amendments - Background 
distribute the securities that renders any contractual representations made by the PIPE 
investors materially false and thus actionable under Section 10(b).  For example, in the Lyon 
case, the evidentiary record indicated that the foregoing representations were made by 
Gryphon in each of the relevant PIPE purchase agreements.  As such, pursuant to Section 
10(b) of the Exchange Act, the SEC alleged that Gryphon made materially false 
representations to the PIPE issuers because Gryphon had, in fact, planned to distribute the 
purchased PIPE securities to cover the short sales into which they would soon enter.  
Gryphon maintained that such representations were not false because their short sales did 
not constitute a “distribution,” as defined under the applicable securities laws, and thus they 
had not misrepresented its investment intention.  In the end, the Court sided with Gryphon 
and accordingly dismissed the SEC’s Section 10(b) claims.  See 529 F. Supp. 2d at 450. 
Similar to claims of securities fraud predicated on Section 10(b), the SEC has also 
increasingly relied on insider trading law as a basis for imposing liability on PIPE investors.  
See cases cited in supra note 148.  The SEC asserts that PIPE investors who engage in short 
selling activity or otherwise transact in the shares of the PIPE issuer while in possession of 
material non-public information about the underlying PIPE offering often do so in violation 
of their contractual pledges to keep such information confidential.  In this context, the SEC 
is essentially relying on the “misappropriation theory” pursuant to which “a person commits 
fraud ‘in connection with’ a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5, when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in 
breach of a duty owed to the source of that information.”  United States v. O’Hagan, 521 
U.S. 642, 652 (1997).  Based on various documents, including, the private placement 
memoranda, purchase agreements, and other ancillary agreements, the SEC has claimed in 
several cases that the PIPE investor defendants either directly or indirectly assumed a duty 
of confidentiality that either expressly or constructively restricted their ability to trade on the 
information conveyed.  See cases cited in supra notes 117, 148. 
For example, in the Lyon case, in addition to the Section 5 claims, the SEC also alleged that 
Gryphon committed insider trading violations by shorting the publicly-traded securities of 
PIPE issuers while in possession of material, non-public information about the 
corresponding PIPE offerings and in violation of their contractual obligations to keep such 
information confidential.  In particular, the SEC argued that Gryphon entered into 
confidentiality agreements or otherwise agreed to use the information provided by various 
PIPE issuers solely for the purpose of evaluating the underlying PIPE transaction.  
However, by trading on such information, according to the SEC, Gryphon misappropriated 
the confidential information in breach of a duty owed to the issuer and therefore committed 
insider trading in violation of Section 10(b).  The court ruled that the SEC had stated a 
plausible claim on this basis, thereby denying the motion to dismiss.  See 529 F. Supp. 2d at 
451-53.  The other two cases discussed in the Section 5 context also declined to grant the 
respective defendants’ motion to dismiss.  See cases cited in supra note 150.  First, the 
Mangan court allowed the SEC to proceed with its insider trading allegations.  See 2007 WL 
4102743 (W.D.N.C. 2007).  Similarly, while the Berlacher court actually dismissed the 
SEC’s insider trading claims, it did so in a manner that permitted the SEC to replead its 
claims with sufficient particularity on what information the defendants were required to 
keep confidential.  See 40 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 149 (E.D. Pa. 2008).  See generally 
Wang & Steinberg, supra note 148.  Subsequently, the court in Mangan granted summary 
judgment to the defendant, thereby dismissing the SEC’s insider traiding claim.  2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 64814 (W.D.N.C. 2008). 
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Until recently, the SEC declined to set forth a formal position focusing 
on the applicability of Rule 415 in the context of PIPEs.  Nonetheless, 
during the Securities Act reform process, the SEC staff appeared to be 
focusing on several characteristics of PIPE transactions in determining 
whether the post-execution distribution of securities constituted a primary 
offering.156   The first issue was the size of the resale offering being 
registered.  In particular, the SEC staff was more likely to consider 
offerings of shares representing more than 30% of the issuer’s public float 
to be a primary offering.157  The second issue that the SEC focused on was 
indicia of control by the selling stockholders, including any board 
representation or other contractual provisions enabling one to procure 
control.  In this context, the more control, the more likely the SEC was to 
view the resale offering as a primary offering.158 
Recently, in response to questions from PIPE issuers, investors, and 
practitioners, the SEC in 2007 clarified its position on resale registration 
statements and noted that its basic threshold for determining whether a 
resale registration is a primary offering is if the relevant registration 
statement sought to register greater than one-third of the issuer’s pre-PIPE 
public float.  Additional factors the SEC considered included the number of 
investors, the length of time the shares were held prior to registration, the 
discount received by the investors, and the relationship of the selling 
shareholders and the issuer.159 
 156. Greenberg, Traurig, LLP, Real Time Legal, Regulatory & Tax Developments 
Impacting Hedge Funds, Private Equity & Investments, PRIVATE FUNDS WEEKLY ROUNDUP, 
(Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2007/0129.pdf.  In a primary 
offering, the proceeds (after expenses) are received directly by the company.  By contrast, a 
secondary offering is generally a registered offering whereby a substantial portion of the 
proceeds of the offering go to the selling shareholders, not the issuing company.  There is 
significance attributable to this distinction.  In particular, more stringent regulatory 
requirements are often imposed on primary offerings.  As such, there are potential 
consequences that could arise from the characterization of a PIPE resale offering as a 
primary offering rather than a secondary offering—a reality that is particularly important to 
PIPE issuers and investors.  These consequences include:  (i) the inability to use Form S-3 
unless the issuer is eligible to use Form S-3 for primary offerings; and (ii) the possibility 
that selling stockholders would be considered statutory underwriters and as such, would be 
exposed to “Section 11” underwriter liability for disclosure deficiencies contained in the 
registration statement, and ineligible to use Rule 144 to resell any of the securities issued in 
the private placement transactions. 
 157. Id.  For purposes of the 30% public float test, the numerator includes all fully-
diluted securities held by the selling stockholder (including any shares issuable upon 
exercise of warrants or conversion of convertible securities, without regard to “blocker” 
provisions), while the denominator only includes actual outstanding shares held by non-
affiliates. 
 158. Id. 
 159. See supra note 156 (inter alia, explaining the significance if an offering is viewed 
as a primary offering). 
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2. Form S-3 Amendments—Overview 
Form S-3 is an abbreviated registration form available to domestic 
companies that satisfy its requirements.  Prior to the SEC’s recent 
amendments, Form S-3 was generally only available to issuers in at the 
market primary offerings of equity securities if, among other things, their 
non-affiliate equity market capitalization (i.e., public float) was $75 million 
or more.160  The primary advantage of Form S-3 is that it allows eligible 
companies to satisfy the disclosure requirements attendant to any registered 
offering by way of automatic incorporation by reference from the periodic 
reports the company is required to file pursuant to the Exchange Act.161  As 
such, Form S-3 provides issuing companies with a more versatile 
registration option because it enables them to avoid much of the 
preparation and other administrative costs that are typically associated with 
an offering made pursuant to other forms, namely Form S-1. 
The recent SEC changes to Form S-3 in some ways expand the 
universe of eligible users.  In particular, Form S-3, as amended, now 
qualifies issuers that do not satisfy the $75 million public float requirement 
for its use in at the market primary offerings of equity securities if certain 
prerequisites are met.  Specifically, according to the amended form, the 
issuer is eligible to use Form S-3 in such situations if it (i) meets all of the 
other registrant eligibility conditions traditionally applicable to the use of 
Form S-3; (ii) has a class of common equity securities that is listed on a 
national securities exchange; (iii) does not sell more than the equivalent of 
one-third of its public float in primary offerings under Form S-3 over the 
previous 12 calendar months; and (iv) is not a shell company and has not 
been a shell company for at least twelve calendar months before the filing 
of the registration statement.162 
In the final rule release announcing the Form S-3 amendments, the 
Commission articulated several reasons for the changes adopted.  First, the 
SEC’s decision to amend Form S-3 is, in part, attributable to the 
recommendations made by the Commission’s Advisory Committee on 
Smaller Public Companies—a committee charged by the SEC in 2006 to 
assess the current regulatory system for smaller companies under U.S. 
securities laws.  In particular, the Advisory Committee recommended, inter 
alia, that the SEC permit all reporting companies with securities listed on a 
national securities exchange or NASDAQ, or quoted on the Over-the-
Counter Bulletin Board electronic quotation service, to be eligible to use 
 160. See General Instruction I.B.1 of Form S-3; see also S-3 Amendment Release, supra 
note 30, at 13 (discussing Form S-3’s history and contemporary applications). 
 161. Id.  See generally Barbara Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets and 
Shelf Regulation -- An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. REV. 135 (1984). 
 162. SEC Amendment Release, supra note 30. 
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Form S-3 if they have been subject to the Exchange Act's reporting 
requirements for at least one year and are current in their periodic reporting 
at the time of the filing.163  While the SEC’s ultimate amendments did not 
represent a wholesale adoption of the Advisory Committee’s 
recommendations, some of them are nonetheless reflected in the new rule.  
An additional reason advanced by the SEC for the amendments of Form S-
3 is the SEC’s belief that the extension of Form S-3 to additional issuers 
should expand these issuers’ access to the public securities markets and 
overall participation in capital formation transactions.164  In this regard, the 
SEC noted that “[t]he shelf eligibility resulting from Form S-3 eligibility 
and the ability to forward incorporate information on Form  S-3, therefore, 
allow companies to avoid traditional delays and interruptions in the 
offering process and can reduce or even eliminate the costs associated with 
preparing and filing post-effective amendments to the registration 
statement.”165  The SEC also cited the significant advances in the electronic 
dissemination and availability of issuer disclosure transmitted by means of 
the Internet during the last several years as an additional justification for 
the expansion of Form S-3 eligible users.166 
3. Form S-3 Amendments—Critique 
The SEC’s recent amendments of Form S-3 may have a profound 
impact on the PIPE market for several key reasons.  First, in a move 
contrary to the recommendations of its Advisory Committee,167 the SEC’s 
amendments extend access to Form S-3 to only companies that either (i) 
satisfy the traditional Form S-3 requirements (primarily the $75 million 
dollar float), or alternatively (ii) satisfy the new conditions articulated by 
the recent form changes.168  However, while these changes benefit the PIPE 
market to a certain extent, some aspects of the SEC’s changes may present 
formidable impediments to a PIPE issuer’s ability to use Form S-3—a more 
advantageous option for the public registration component of PIPE 
 163. Recommendation IV.P.3. of the Final Report of the Advisory Committee on 
Smaller Public Companies (Apr. 23, 2006), at 68-72, available at  
http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acspc/acspc-finalreport.pdf. 
 164. S-3 Amendment Release, supra note 30, at 7. 
 165. Id. at 6-7. 
 166. In particular, the SEC’s position on this factor, as articulated in the final rule release 
provides that “[t]he pervasiveness of the Internet in daily life and the advent of EDGAR as a 
central repository of company filings have combined to allow widespread, direct, and 
contemporaneous accessibility to company disclosure at little or no cost to those interested 
in obtaining the information.  For this, we think it is appropriate to once again expand the 
class of companies who may register primary offerings on Form S-3 in a limited manner.”  
Id. at 6-8. 
 167. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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transactions. 
One of these new conditions is the requirement that an issuer (not 
meeting the traditional public float requirements) be listed on a national 
securities exchange.169  As such, while the rule will provide a benefit to 
many PIPE stock exchange listed issuers that were not previously eligible 
to use Form S-3 in connection with the registration of PIPE shares, these 
changes also simultaneously exclude a significant number of companies 
that would have been able, pursuant to the Advisory Committee’s 
recommendations, to utilize Form S-3 to issue shares in registered direct 
offerings and to thereby maximize the benefit of smaller discounts that this 
alternative to the traditional PIPE structure affords.  The SEC’s rationale 
for conditioning eligibility under the new Form S-3 rules to issuers having 
a class of common equity securities that are listed on a national securities 
exchange is rooted in the Commission’s primary directive—the furtherance 
of investor protection.170 
Particularly, the SEC believes that the following factors associated 
with listing on a national securities exchange will combine to ensure that 
the expansion of Form S-3 eligibility that will be precipitated by the recent 
amendments does not create room for abuse and therefore, the erosion of 
investor protection in the PIPE sector of the investment community.  In the 
final rule release, the SEC articulated its position that the following 
“common attributes allow the exchanges to sustain efficient and liquid 
markets that should help monitor the expansion of shelf registration 
eligibility on Form S-3 and help mitigate any attendant risks posed by 
expansion.”171  The common attributes are:   
• “[T]he exchanges’ listing rules and procedures, as well as 
other requirements, provide an additional measure of 
protection for investors.  Exchanges have both quantitative 
and qualitative listing rules that are designed to evidence that 
their listed issuers meet specified minimum requirements 
 169. A “national securities exchange” is a securities exchange that has registered with 
the Commission under Section 6 of the Exchange Act.  There are currently ten securities 
exchanges registered under Section 6(a) of the Exchange Act as national securities 
exchanges.  These are the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, 
NASDAQ, the Boston Stock Exchange, the Chicago Board Options Exchange, the Chicago 
Stock Exchange, the International Securities Exchange, the National Stock Exchange 
(formerly the Cincinnati Stock Exchange), NYSE Arca (formerly the Pacific Exchange), 
and the Philadelphia Stock Exchange.  In addition, an exchange that lists or trades security 
futures products (as defined in Section 3(a)(56) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. 78c(56)]) 
may register as a national securities exchange under Section 6(g) of the Exchange Act solely 
for the purpose of trading security futures products.  For purposes of new General 
Instruction I.B.6., however, only exchanges registered under Section 6(a) of the Exchange 
Act will be deemed to be “national securities exchanges.” 
 170. See supra note 30, at 19-23. 
 171. Id. at 22. 
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when the issuer first lists on the exchange and thereafter.” 172 
• “Initial listing standards serve as a means for an exchange to 
screen issuers and to provide listed status to issuers with 
sufficient public float, investor base, and trading interest to 
assure that the market for the issuer’s security has the depth 
and liquidity necessary to maintain fair and orderly 
markets;”173 
• “Maintenance listing criteria help assure that the issuer 
continues to meet the exchange’s standards for depth and 
liquidity;”174 and 
• “Exchange-listed securities also are subject to real-time 
reporting of quotation and transaction information, which 
benefits investors by apprising them of current market 
information about the security.”175 
Nonetheless, the SEC’s 2007 amendments expanding the scope of the 
Form S-3 contradicts the Commission’s principal rationale for the Form’s 
adoption.  In promulgating the Form S-3 in 1982, the SEC “relie[d] on the 
efficient market theory, allow[ing] a maximum use of incorporation of 
Exchange Act reports and requir[ing] the least disclosure to be presented in 
the prospectus and delivered to investors.”176  As then adopted, the Form S-
 172. Id. at 21.  For example, while exchange listing standards can vary from exchange to 
exchange, they generally uniformly require listed issuers to (i) meet certain standards 
relating to the number of public shareholders and shares outstanding, shareholder approval 
of specified matters, and in certain cases, earnings or income; and (ii) meet specified 
corporate governance standards, including the requirement that certain committees of the 
issuer’s board be composed solely of independent directors.  In contrast, automated inter-
dealer quotation systems such as the Over-the-Counter Bulletin Board and Pink Sheets do 
not provide companies with the ability to list their securities, but, rather, serve as a medium 
for the over-the-counter securities market by collecting and distributing market maker 
quotes to subscribers.  As such, these automated inter-dealer quotation systems do not 
maintain or impose listing standards, nor do they have a listing agreement or arrangement 
with the companies whose securities are quoted through them. 
 173. Id. at 21. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383, 
Exchange Act Release No. 18524, 1982 WL 90370 (Mar. 3,1982).  The U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized that the fraud-onthe-market theory creates a rebuttable presumption of reliance 
in Exchange Act Section 10(b) securities litigation.  See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 
224, 225 (1988) (holding that the presumption “relieves the Rule 10b-5 plaintiff of an 
unrealistic evidentiary burden, and is consistent with, and supportive of, the Act's policy of 
requiring full disclosure and fostering reliance on market integrity.”).  See generally MARC 
I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION:  LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 7.05 (2008); Donald C. 
Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation:  Market Efficiency 
Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851 (1992) (arguing that, while theoretical in construct, the 
fraud-on-the-market theory is extremely practical in its application); Jonathan R. Macey, 
The Fraud on the Market Theory:  Some Preliminary Issues, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 923 
(1989) (“After Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the issue of whether a particular stock traded in an 
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3 could be used in primary at the market offerings of common stock only if 
the subject issuer had filed its Exchange Act reports for at least a 36-month 
period and had a public float of $150 million (or alternatively a public float 
of $100 million and three million share trading volume on an annual 
basis).177  In 1992, still adhering to the efficient market rationale, the 
Commission lowered the Form S-3 for issuers having such equity offerings 
to a 12-month reporting history and $75 million public float.178 
The U.S. Supreme Court has given its approbation to the efficient 
market theory in the securities litigation context.179  In ascertaining whether 
a subject security trades in an efficient market, lower courts view Form S-3 
eligibility as a key criterion.180  Given this history underlying the Form S-
3’s adoption and implementation, the SEC’s expansion of Form S-3 to 
encompass issuers that may not be traded in an efficient market is a 
significant departure.  Indeed, the Commission’s 2007 amendments may be 
viewed as an effort to facilitate capital raising while implicitly rationalizing 
that any security listed on a national securities exchange is, by definition, 
efficient market will now become an important part of every fraud on the market case.”); 
William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments That the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 341 (1986) (questioning traditional assumption that market can efficiently price 
securities). 
 177. Securities Act Release No. 6383 (1982). 
 178. Securities Act Release No. 6964 (1992).  This rule change allowed approximately 
450 additional issuers to use the Form S-3 for such equity offerings.  Id. 
 179. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).  The Supreme Court stated: 
The presumption [of reliance] is . . . . supported by common sense and 
probability.  Recent empirical studies have tended to confirm Congress’ premise 
that the market price of shares traded on well-developed markets reflects all 
publicly available information, and hence, any material misrepresentations.  It 
has been noted that “it is hard to imagine that there ever is a buyer or seller who 
does not rely on market integrity.  Who would knowingly roll the dice in a 
crooked crap game?”  Indeed, nearly every court that has considered the 
proposition has concluded that where materially misleading statements have 
been disseminated into an impersonal, well-developed market for securities, the 
reliance of individual plaintiffs on the integrity of the market price may be 
presumed.  Commentators generally have applauded the adoption of one 
variation or another of the fraud-on-the-market theory.  An investor who buys 
or sells stock at the price set by the market does so in reliance on the integrity of 
that price.  Because most publicly available information is reflected in market 
price, an investor’s reliance on any public material misrepresentations, 
therefore, may be presumed for purposes of a Rule 10b-5 action. 
Id. at 246-47. 
 180. See, e.g., Freeman v. Laventhol and Horwath, 915 F.3d 193, 199 (6th Cir. 1995) 
(eligibility to use Form S-3 key factor); Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1275-87 
(D.N.J. 1989) (stating that companies entitled to use SEC Form S-3 would almost by 
definition encompass stocks traded in a “special developed market”); Harman v. 
Lymphomed, Inc., 122 F.R.D. 522, 525 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (stating that Form S-3 status is 
perhaps the “most significant” factor that the market for the stock was efficient). 
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traded in an efficient market.  This rationalization, however, contravenes 
established doctrine that the critical inquiry is the market for that particular 
stock, not the location where such stock trades.181 
On the other hand, from a capital raising perspective, by limiting the 
availability of the Form S-3 under the newly promulgated rules to 
companies that are listed on a national securities exchange, the SEC may 
impede the ability of an appreciable number of OTC companies to avail 
themselves of the transactional benefits inherent in the PIPE capital 
financing paradigm.  As a result, the PIPE market may not be able to derive 
the benefits generated by other recent SEC regulatory changes.  For 
example, as discussed above, the SEC in 2007 adopted amendments to 
Rule 144 in a move that will provide an added level of liquidity to PIPE 
investors by making their shares (of an Exchange Act reporting issuer) 
freely tradable, irrespective of registration, after a newly abbreviated 
holding period of six months rather than a year.182  This change, and most 
importantly, the level of liquidity it infuses was expected to increase both 
issuer and investor appetites for PIPEs and accordingly the overall level of 
PIPE transactions.  However, the SEC’s decision to exclude OTC 
companies from Form S-3 eligibility, hence increasing the costs of such 
public offerings, may adversely impact the number of PIPE transactions. 
Another key consideration regarding the SEC’s recent Form S-3 
changes is the public float cap that is placed on the use of Form S-3.  
According to the new rule, issuers are permitted to use Form S-3 for the 
registration of securities that do not exceed one-third of the company’s 
public float.183  Although the SEC’s final cap of one-third of the public 
float is larger than the cap that was originally proposed,184 it places a firm 
limitation on the optimization of the PIPE market by restraining the size of 
 181. Harman, 122 F.R.D. at 525.  See In re Polymedica Corp. Securities Litigation, 432 
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2005); In re Xcelera.com Securities Litigation, 430 F.3d 503 (1st Cir. 2005); 
Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2005); infra note 185; see also Oscar 
Private Equity Investments v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261, 269-70 (5th Cir. 
2007) (holding that plaintiffs must “demonstrate loss causation before triggering the 
presumption of reliance” and that “loss causation must be established at the class 
certification stage by a preponderance of all admissible evidence”). 
 182. See supra notes 119-135 and accompanying text. 
 183. As discussed in the final rule release, it is important to note that the one-third cap 
imposed by the new General Instruction I.B.6. to Form S-3 is only applicable to offerings 
conducted pursuant to Form S-3.  As such, an issuer that is prevented from utilizing Form S-
3 due to the new volume limitation, is not precluded from registering a primary offering of 
securities on Form S-1 or executing private placements.  However, an issuer that is forced to 
take this route will lose the efficiency benefits that are often attributable to offerings 
conducted pursuant to Form S-3. 
 184. As proposed, new General Instruction I.B.6. of Form S-3 would have limited the 
amount of securities eligible companies could sell in accordance with its provision to no 
more than the equivalent of 20% of their public float over any period of twelve calendar 
months. 
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PIPE transactions that can be executed pursuant to Form S-3 registration.  
According to the SEC, “raising the cap to one-third of public float will 
allow an offering that is large enough to help an issuer raise a relatively 
significant amount of capital when market opportunities rise, but still small 
enough for the SEC to moderate the expansion of shelf eligibility with 
appropriate attention to the protection for investors, including the effect 
such new issuance may have on the market for a thinly traded security.”185  
Additionally, while the SEC believes that the volume limitation still will 
facilitate the promotion of capital formation (particularly for smaller 
companies) in a manner consistent with the furtherance of investor 
protection, its adoption of the amendments does not foreclose the 
possibility that it may revisit the appropriateness of the one-third cap in the 
future.186 
A major problem with the SEC’s one-third volume requirement is that, 
in practice, it may be illusory.  Under the 2007 amendments, an issuer must 
be listed on a national securities exchange in order to utilize Form S-3.  As 
such, these issuers may be subject to abide by volume requirements 
mandated by the applicable exchange that in some situations may be more 
stringent that the SEC’s one-third rule.  For example, companies that are 
listed on the Nasdaq Stock Exchange are subject to its listing rules and 
requirements.  One such requirement is Nasdaq Rule 4350(i)(D) (the “20 
Percent Rule”) pursuant to which a company cannot issue voting securities 
such as common stock, convertible preferred stock, or convertible debt and 
warrants in a private transaction, at a price less than the greater of book 
value or market value, constituting in the aggregate 20 percent or more of 
its common or voting power outstanding prior to such issuance.187  
Therefore, by allowing only companies that are traded on national 
exchanges (such as the Nasdaq) to invoke the revised Form S-3 rules, the 
Commission, in practical effect, ensures that an enterprise seeking to issue 
 185. See S-3 Amendment Release, supra note 30, at 18.  The SEC’s reference to “a 
thinly traded security” is an admission that any such security does not trade in an efficient 
market.  Allowing such issuers to use Form S-3 for primary offerings of common stock is a 
significant departure from prior practice.  See also Harman, 122 F.R.D. at 525 n.1 (stating 
that “[t]he SEC’s explicit rationale for this [disclosure] system is that information on 
companies which file an S-3 form is widely available in the market, and therefore need not 
be disseminated in the prospectus”); supra notes 179-181 and accompanying text. 
 186. See S-3 Amendment Release, supra note 30, at 18. 
 187. See NASDAQ, Inc., Manual §4320(i)(D) (2008), available at 
http://wallstreet.cch.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1%5F
1%5F4%5F1&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequityrules%2F.  
Notwithstanding the prohibition contained in NASDAQ rule 4320(i)(D), “NASDAQ may 
make exceptions to the requirement when the delay in securing stockholder approval would 
seriously jeopardize the financial viability of the enterprise and reliance by the company on 
this exception is expressly approved by the Audit Committee or a comparable body of the 
Board of Directors.”  Id. at IM-4340(a), n.1; see also Gormley, supra note 15, at 23. 
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the one-third maximum of its public float (at less than the greater of market 
or book value) will be impeded unless it procures shareholder approval.188 
V. CONCLUSION 
The foregoing discussion confirms that the PIPE financing alternative 
has evolved into a versatile capital formation mechanism.  In current 
market conditions, as the process of capital formation continues to undergo 
significant transformation, subject companies are now, more than ever, 
reluctant to incur the costs that are becoming increasingly associated with 
traditional capital formation options, like the registered offering or certain 
types of exempt offerings.189  As such, PIPEs stand to serve as a flexible 
financing mechanism for issuers and an attractive investment alternative for 
investors. 
In fact, the PIPE as a financing structural alternative is becoming a 
mainstay in the investment community, and several factors have combined 
to make this possible.  First, as discussed in the introduction of this article, 
current market conditions have created an investment environment that has 
constricted traditional sources of capital.  The credit market, in particular, 
has stalled and as a result, the traditional capital wells of private equity and 
bank debt also have faltered.  Similarly, recent regulatory developments, 
including the amendments to Rule 144, have created an investment 
paradigm with the potential to optimize the value of PIPEs to issuers and 
investors. 
 Yet, while the foregoing paints an optimistic picture for PIPEs, this 
optimism is tempered by other developments that give rise for analysis.  In 
particular, as PIPEs gained recognition, the SEC’s regulation of PIPEs has 
correspondingly heightened.  As a result of this amplified regulatory 
scrutiny, the value inherent in PIPEs may be constrained and thus not fully 
optimized.  However, on balance, the stage has been set and PIPEs will 
likely remain a major player in the arena of capital formation alternatives.  
In summary, the pipeline is flowing—PIPEs continue to offer suitable 
issuers the opportunity to raise capital efficiently while providing investors 
with a versatile investment tool that seeks to maximize financial returns. 
 188. See Max Fumes, SEC Shortens, Grandfathers Rule 144 Holding Periods, The PIPEs 
Report, vol. V, No. 22 (December 18, 2007) (noting that “a company trying to issue 33% of 
its float may bump up against the Nasdaq limitation, and vice versa.  But given the Nasdaq’s 
built-in ceiling, securities experts wonder why the SEC is imposing a cap at all.”). 
 189. The Regulation A, intrastate public, and Rule 506 (to non-accredited investors) 
exemptions are examples.  Extensive costs are incurred and government regulation prevails 
in such offerings.  See Steven Bradford, Transaction Exemptions in the Securities Act of 
1933:  An Economic Analysis, 45 EMORY L.J. 591 (1996) (describing the various exemptions 
to registration and their associated costs). 
